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Abstract
This study considers the making of the Baghdad Pact in the Middle East and 
analyses the Anglo-American relations around this security organisation. A defense 
organisation which was to embody states bordering south of the Soviet Union was the 
American conception of the Nothern Tier project in the first half of the 1950s. The 
Baghdad Pact eventually represented an adaptation of the Nothern Tier in which Britain 
was the leading country. The Baghdad Pact to which Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and 
Britain belonged and of which the United States was defined loosely associated was a 
security organisation designed to entrench the Western positions against the Soviet 
Union in the Middle East in an era o f general instability.
The first step towards the forming of a group of Northern Tier States was a treaty 
of friendship and cooperation signed on 3 April 1954 between Turkey and Pakistan. 
Subsequently, the Pact between Turkey and Iraq was signed in Baghdad on 24 February 
1955. On 5 April, Britain’s formal accession turned the Turkish-Iraqi Pact into the 
Baghdad Pact. The formation of the Baghdad Pact coincided with chaotic international 
changes and different perceptions of the regional states especially that o f Egypt. From 
the outset, Gamal Abd-el Nasser, and Egyptian nationalist, and a Pan-Arabist, opposed 
the Pact and unremittingly blamed the Iraqi government for Joining this British 
initiative. Nasser’s anti-Pact policies had also effect on the Jordanian government which 
had problems to control the public sentiment. As a result, Jordan remained outside of 
the Pact. Despite these developments, American involvement in this alliance remained 
less extensive than British involvement. Apparently, there were divided views in the US 
government about the Baghdad Pact and Egypt. Given this premise, the main theme 
which will be discussed in this dissertation is the Anglo-American policies and their 
differences around the Baghdad Pact and the events which hampered this security 
organisation to develop into a long-lasting security mechanism.
The failure to accomplish a strong defensive grouping in the Middle East was the 
end result of the lack of unanimous actions of the US and Britain. British views of the 
region was contrasted with the American government’s perception of regional dynamics. 
Ultimately, the US contended itself with observer status in the organisation. In the end, 
after Iraq’s defection in 1958following the coup of dissident military units, the Baghdad 
Pact functionally ended.
IV
özet
Bu çalışma Ortadoğu’da Bağdat Paktı’nın kurulması üzerinedir ve bu güvenlik 
organizasyonu çevresindeki Îngiliz-Amerikan ilişkilerini analiz eder. Sovyetler Birliği’ni 
güneyden sınırlayan ülkelerin bir savuma organizasyonu içerisine dahil edilmesi, 
1950’lerin ilk yarısında Amerikan kavramsallaştırması olan Kuzey Kuşağı projesiydi. 
Sonuçta, Bağdat Paktı, içinde İngiltere’nin başı çeken ülke olduğu Kuzey Kuşağı 
projesi’nin bir uygulaması oldu. Türkiye, Irak, İran, Pakistan ve İngiltere’nin içerisinde 
olduğu ve Amerikanın da gevşek bir şekilde ilişkili olarak tanımlandığı Bağdat Paktı, 
genel bir istikrarsızlık döneminde Ortadoğuda Batı pozisyonları ’nın güçlendirilmesi için 
tasarlanmış bir güvenlik organizasyonuydu.
Bir Kuzey Kuşağı devletleri grubu oluştumaya doğru ilk adım 3 Nisan 1954’de 
Türkiye ve Pakistan arasında imzalanan dostluk ve işbirliği anlaşması oldu. Bunu 
takiben, 24 Şubat 1955’de Türkiye ve Irak arasında Bağdat’da Pakt imzalandı. 5 Nisan 
da İngiltere’nin resmi girişiyle, Türk-Irak Paktı, Bağdat Paktına dönüştü. Bağdat 
Paktı’mn kurulması, karmaşık uluslararası değişimlerle aynı zamana ve aralarında 
özellikle Mısır’ın olduğu bölgedeki ülkelerin farklı algılamalarıyla karşılaştı. 
Başlangıçtan itibaren, bir Mısır milliyetçisi ve Arab birliği savunucusu olan Cemal 
Abd-ül Nasır, Pakt’a karşı çıktı ve vazgeçmez şekilde Irak hükümetini bu İngiliz 
insiyatifine katılmakla suçladı. Nasır’m Pakt karşıtı politikaları, halkın hassasiyetini 
kontol etmekte zorlanan Ürdün hükümeti üzerinde de etkili oldu. Sonuç olarak, Ürdün 
Pakt’ın dışında kaldı. Bu gelişmelere rağmen. Amerikan hükümetin de Bağdat Paktı ve 
Mısır hakkında birbirinden ayrı görüşler vardı. Bu zemin belirlenmiş olarak, tezde 
tartışılacak ana tema, Bağdat Paktı etrafındaki İngiliz-Amerikan politikaları ve bu 
güvenlik mekanizması ’nın uzun ömürlü olmasını engelleyen olaylardır.
Ortadoğu’da güçlü bir savunma gruplaşmasının başanlamaması, Amerika ve 
İngiltere arasındaki mutabık hareketlerin eksikliğindendi. İngiltere’nin bölgede ki 
görüşleri, Amerika’nın bölgesel dinamikleri algılamasıyla zıtlaşmıştı. En son olarak, 
Amerika organizasyon içerisinde kendini gözlemci statüsü ile bağladı. Irak’ın 1958’de 
muhalif askeri birimlerin darbesinin ardından ayrılmasıyla da Bağdat Paktı işlevsel 
olarak sona erdi.
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I INTRODUCTION
The Middle East is an unstable area with its own internal deep seated problems 
and conflicts. This instability has attracted the intervention of both Cold War super­
powers, but in different ways and on different premises. By its nature, the Baghdad 
Pact was designed to entrench the Western policies against communism in the Middle 
East, as well as aiming to establish a collective security system in the region. A defense 
organization to include Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and probably Syria was the 
'‘'American promotion of the ‘Northern Tier’ concept during the period 1953-54” * , at a 
time when British presence for a security organisation mostly focused on the Suez Canal 
Zone in Egypt. At this juncture, considerable evidence suggests that there were some 
differences between the American strategic interests in the Middle East and those of 
Britain. For the former, the containment of any Soviet influence in the “outer-ring” 
area which had become known as the Northern Tier (and later known as the Baghdad 
Pact) was the main priority, whilst the British were mainly concentrated upon 
consolidating their own position in the “inner-ring” of the area, most notably Egypt.  ^
The Baghdad Pact eventually represented an adaptation of the Northern Tier scheme in 
which “Britain was glad to take the lead. ” ^
When the British and American governments attempted to reorganise their 
defense positions in the Middle East, they did so with the intention of consolidating 
their stand against the Soviet threat through an ideological and actual penetration into 
this region. Here, it will also be discussed if the policies of the UK and US in the 
Middle East were the outcome of an intricate pattern of relationships between the
American and British administrations which were not necessarily at harmony at all 
times.
In any event, the Pact itself was one of great significance to the United 
Kingdom. This was a region of particular importance to Britain because of a long 
historical relationship, the presence of oil and the proximity of the region to the 
southern frontiers of the Soviet Union. Britain possessed not only treaty obligations 
within the Baghdad Pact, but also relationships with states outside the alliance structure.
This defense organisation that Britain was canvassing was seen as an instrument 
to prolong Western influence in the Middle East. It was asserted that it would 
strengthen Western positions and act as a major deterrent to Soviet influence. With 
these prospects, the Baghdad Pact was promoted as opening the real possibility of a 
political and military alliance, sympathetic to the West and protective of its interests, 
specifically of oil and the Suez Canal. The first step towards the forming of a group of 
Northern Tier states was a treaty of friendship and cooperation signed on 3 April 1954, 
between Turkey and Pakistan. But the difficulties were not resolved. Not surprisingly, 
the Indian resentment of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement came first. The Kashmir 
question, the division of the canal waters, and compensation for refugee properties were 
still the sources of dispute between India and Pakistan, leading to the objections of the 
former. At the time of the announcement of the extension of US military aid to 
Pakistan, the objection of India to Pakistan’s inclusion in this Pact was at its peak. A 
remark expressed by Indian right-wing journal. Capital, claimed that as long as India 
and Pakistan were carrying on a cold war of their own, any military assistance by a 
third power to Pakistan would be an act of hostility to India. Moreover, Nehru stated 
that the Pact would enlarge the area of the cold war, make actual war likelier, and
threaten India with involvement if war came. In his turn, the Pakistani Prime Minister, 
Muhammed Ali Bogra, charged Nehru of endeavouring to hold the balance of power 
between the two blocs, and feared weakening of his bargaining power. In addition to 
hostile Indian statements against the Pakistani inclusion in this new organisation, when 
it came to the formation of the Pact (as this thesis concentrates on) explosive 
developments took place. Egypt and Israel blatantly objected to Iraq’s membership, 
clearly for very different reasons.
For the purpose of this thesis, the definition of the Middle East will follow the 
geographic delimitations established in official State Department records, namely; the 
Eastern Mediterranean, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel and the Arab states. '' Among the 
Arab states, a special emphasis will be made on Egypt as it was the principal country 
for Britain in the region.
In the course of a series of developments, one cardinal difference emerged 
between the Anglo-American outlooks. Oddly, the United States, despite its major 
leading role in launching the project, held back while Britain joined it. Besides, it 
''tried to take credit for this attitude in capitals like Cairo which were hostile to the 
pact”.  ^At this stage, Gamal Abd-el Nasser, an Egyptian nationalist, and a Pan-Arabist 
who wished to eliminate foreign influence not just in Egypt, but throughout the Middle 
East, became the central figure of resistance to the Baghdad Pact. Being backed in his 
course by the Soviet Union, which was taking care to avoid any overt interference in 
Arab affairs, Nasser gradually moved into the Soviet sphere. Further events as it 
happened in the negotiations for the construction of a High Dam at Aswan which 
resulted in the US withdrawal of aid, embittered Nasser. Thereafter, the region became 
a scene of the escalating tensions to the extent of precipitating the war over Suez. In
other words, Egypt’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal remarked a turning point in 
Middle Eastern history. For Britain, to abandon control of the Suez Canal was a risk 
hardly to be contemplated. The experience of the two world wars '"had confirmed the 
importance of the waterway to British trade and security in the Middle East and North 
Africa.” ® But the crisis itself, and the aftermath, presented a political discord between 
the US and the UK. As a result, the US refused to support Britain and France in the 
war over Suez. Besides, the UN condemned France and Israel together with Britain 
with bringing about the crisis.
Given this premise, the thesis divided into five main parts. The second part 
considers the Anglo-American attitudes to Middle Eastern security. In this section, a 
reappraisal of Britain’s Middle East policy in post WW II is analysed. Consecutively, 
the start of the Cold War which prompted a major turn in Anglo-American policy 
making is explained. This is followed by analysing the Tripartite Declaration, the Four 
Power Treaty and the formation of the Middle Eastern Defense Organisation (MEDO). 
Then, the coup of July 1952 in Egypt is evaluated. The first chapter ends with 
discussing the shift of the Anglo-American policy makers to the Northern Tier project 
of the US. Chapter two discusses the formation of the Baghdad Pact. Here, Gamal 
Abd’el Nasser’s arms deal with the Soviets is also investigated in the context of 
increasing instability in the region against a background of hopes relied in the formation 
of the Baghdad Pact. Chapter three is an analysis of the political instability in the 
Middle East in the latter part of 1955 and 1956. Subsequently, the discussion focuses on 
the regional tensions towards the precipitation of the Suez Crisis caused by Nasser’s 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal. Lastly, the British policy shifted to military 
intervention in the Suez and the US opposition to this is analysed. This conflict of
interest is investigated in the context of damages inflicted upon the hopes invested on 
the infant Baghdad Pact. The thesis concludes with stating the reasons which hampered 
the Baghdad Pact from emerging as a regional security system.
The main theme which will be discussed in this framework, is the Anglo- 
American policies and their differences around the Baghdad Pact, and the various 
challenges directed to this organisation that prevented the development of the Baghdad 
Pact into a regional security system.
Certainly, it is worth pointing out that, the attention of the Anglo-American 
foreign policy makers had already been drawn to the necessity of implementing a new 
strategy in the Middle East by the end of WW II. At this juncture, having regarded the 
emerging tensions, the British wished to perpetuate their influence in the region. Given 
this, this thesis begins with discussing the post-war policy of the British government in 
the Middle East.
II THE COLD WAR AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ATTITUDES TO
MIDDLE EASTERN SECURITY
(2.1) Attlee, Bevin and A Reappraisal of the British Policy in the Middle
East
Following the end of the Second World War, it was an immediate necessity for 
Britain to concentrate on its Middle Eastern strongholds. For its oil supplies it was a 
crucial area for British economic recovery and the military bases in the region were 
indispensable to safeguard Britain’s position as a commonwealth power. The dual 
question of how to preserve the oil supplies in the area and the military bases were first 
to be addressed by the post-war Labour Government headed by Clement Attlee, and the 
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. Bevin and the Chiefs of Staff regarded the Middle 
East as having acquired a significant role in peace time and emphasized the strategic 
importance of the region in time of antagonisms.
In a period of growing resentment towards the British in Egypt and Palestine, it 
was essential that facilities were maintained in the Middle East. To overcome the 
disturbances in these countries, Bevin tried to pursue a strategy of maintaining Britain’s 
political and economic interests in the area with the renewal of bilateral treaties. Bevin’s 
efforts to realize long-term treaties with the Middle Eastern states were mostly 
hampered by the growing disturbances of the Arab nationalists in these countries of 
the British influence.
Against this background, Egyptian nationalism complicated the Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations. Towards the end of 1945, the Wafd party, led by Mustapha Nahas, 
emerged as the leading organisation of the nationalists. Wafdists demanded that Prime
Minister, Ismail Sidky, agree to nothing except unconditional British withdrawal from 
Egypt. In the meantime, Wafdist newspapers argued that a defense partnership would 
also mean prolonged British occupation of the country. When talks started in April 
1946, Sidky acquiesced to Wafdist policies. He stated that the presence of British under 
any agreement undermined Egyptian sovereignty, and interfered with Egyptian internal 
affairs and violated the UN Charter. ‘
In order to control Egyptian nationalism, Bevin reassigned Ambassador Lord 
Killearn (formerly Miles Lampson), the man responsible for the 4 February 1942 
incident.  ^ He also sent Secretary of State for Air, Lord Stansgate, who was known for 
his sympathy towards Egyptian demands to proceed with the talks in Cairo. But, 
domestic pressures caused Sidky to oppose British proposals. At this stage, Bevin was 
faced with a dilemma. Anything less than unconditional withdrawal from the Canal 
Zone might provoke nationalistic violence against the British troops and compel the 
Egyptian government to seek a United Nations censure of the British occupation. Yet 
maintenance of the British presence in Egypt was essential on strategic grounds. Bevin 
explained to the Defense Committee, “'If we move out of the Mediterranean, Russia will 
move in, and the Mediterranean countries, from the point of view of commerce and 
trade, economy and democracy, will be finished. ”  ^ On the other hand, Bevin and 
Attlee decided to agree to withdraw troops and count on the Egyptian Government. 
They thought that such an attitude would lead to a voluntary invitation of Egypt of the 
British for a joint defense arrangement. The Chiefs of Staff explained that, “it would be 
better. . . .  to make a bold gesture at the outset. . . . and thus hope to gain the willing 
cooperation of the Egyptian Government in negotiating the base and other requirements 
in Egypt which are essential to us both in war and also in peace.” On 7 May 1946,
Attlee publicly announced concessions to the Egyptian government for the aim of 
ensuring a more favourable atmosphere for negotiations. But this did not lead to desired 
effects. Besides, domestic opposition which culminated in Conservative Party’s 
complaints took place.
In October 1946, at the renewal of 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, which had 
provided the basis for formal independence of Egypt in return for British entitlement to 
defend the Suez Canal, differences arose in relation to the control of Sudan. The 
country had been administered under Anglo-Egyptian dual control since the 1899 
Condominium agreement, and the tension emergent over Sudan was in relation with 
Egypt’s desire to unite this country with itself. Although Egypt enthusiastically wanted 
to restore its rule over Sudan, Britain opposed Egyptian domination of this country. 
Following this dispute, there were no further talks over Sudan for the British fear that it 
would bring the negotiations on the Suez base to an impasse. In their turn, the 
Americans were continuing their efforts to persuade Egypt not to abrogate its treaty 
with the UK.
The bottleneck was left behind in the same month when Sidky arrived in 
London. Bevin agreed to withdraw the British troops from Cairo and Alexandria by 31 
March 1947 and all of Egypt by 1 September 1949. In return, Sidky stated that Egypt 
would participate in a joint defense board to consult in the event of war in the Middle 
East. Over Sudan, parties reached an ambiguous settlement recognizing ''the framework 
of unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common crown of Egypt”,  ^ but 
explaining their aim as Sudanese well-being, independence, and self-government. 
Clearly, Britain was not considering a complete withdrawal from Sudan. The main
British political course was to maintain the British presence in Sudan whilst making 
some concessions to Egypt.
As a result of the differing interpretations of the clause for Sudan, the Sidky- 
Bevin treaty was short lived. Following his return to Cairo, Sidky announced that he 
had secured unity with Sudan. Shortly after, uprisings broke in Khartoum by the 
members of the pro-independence Umma party. Bevin publicy repudiated Sidky’s 
statements and Attlee invited the leaders of Umma party to London. Two days later, 
Sidky resigned in protest and Mahmoud Nokrashy returned to office for the second 
time. On 27 January 1947, Nokrashy declared that Egypt would appeal to the UN to 
order Britain to evacuate Egypt and Sudan. ^
At this crucial moment, Bevin considered that the decline in Britain’s economic 
power and the increasing difficulties to control Arab nationalism required the 
involvement of US in Middle Eastern affairs. Though some officials of the State 
Department would choose to support the Egyptian struggle for independence and urge 
London to make concessions to Cairo, in a period of increasing tensions the US decided 
not to risk alienating the British. Much to the disappointment of the Egyptians, who 
desired American backing of their sovereignty, soon after the Security Council 
hearings, the US gave its full support to the United Kingdom. As it will be further 
discussed under the title below, in replacement of the commercial and ideological 
interests, strategic concerns were shaping American policy making.
(2.2) Facing the Cold War in the Middle East
An American diplomat in Moscow, George Kennan’s cable, which was sent on 
22 February 1946, is rightly regarded as one of the landmark documents on the early 
Cold War period. Here Kennan stated that:
. . . .  Whereever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be 
made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these 
efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here 
as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as northern Iran,
Turkey, . . .  a “friendly” Persian Government might be asked to grant 
Russia a port on Persian Gulf. . . . ’
. . . .  Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes 
pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can 
happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims 
(Turkey, Iran). . . .  *
Corresponding to Kennan’s analysis, initial dispute broke out over Iran. The 
country had been occupied by Britain and the Soviets since 1941 and both countries had 
agreed to withdraw by 2 March 1946. However, even before the war ended, the Soviets 
tried to exact an oil concession from the Iranian government. Failing to realize this, the 
Soviets began to encourage the northern province of Azerbaijan to establish its 
independence under Russian influence. In its turn, the Truman Administration became 
determined to resist Soviet aggression. Consecutively, American support was given to 
the Shah’s decision to send troops to the northern border. The issue came before the 
Security Council in January 1946. The US strongly supported Iran’s appeal to the 
United Nations for the Soviet withdrawal and the US Secretary of State, James Byrnes, 
also seized the chance to publicly condemn Soviet menace. After a deadline for the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces passed in March 1946, the US embassy in Moscow issued 
notes of protest to the Soviet government. To show the great concern of the US about 
Middle Eastern situations, the US Government dispatched the battleship Missouri to 
Istanbul to return the body of the Turkish Ambassador to the United States, who had 
recently died in Washington. Meanwhile, heated exchanges concerning the situation in 
Iran occured in the United Nations between Byrnes and the Soviet ambassador Andrei 
Gromyko.  ^ Finally, in May of that year, Soviet forces withdrew from Iran.
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A few days before the US’ decision to send military advisers to Iran, the Soviets 
also tried to bring pressure to bear on Turkey to permit Soviet troops to have bases near 
the Straits. Together with this, the Soviets also demanded to restore the pre-first WW 
status quo, in the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan. This shocking incident 
reinforced the already strong suspicions of Anglo-American officials. A special report 
prepared for President Truman by his White House aide, Clark Clifford stated that, 
''compromise and concessions are considered by the Soviets as the evidence of 
weakness.". Here, it was also underlined that the US must avoid the error of 
appeasement and should even be prepared to go to war if necessary to resist Stalin’s 
ambitions for world conquest.
As it was anticipated, the increasing involvement of the United States in Middle 
Eastern politics paved the way for a new Anglo-American cooperation. The US interest 
was focused on a Graeco-Turkish-Iranian tier to contain the Soviet Union. Indeed, the 
US was highly engaged in Western Europe, Greece, and Turkey and in the Middle 
East, where its policy was to support Britain to exert its influence in the region as long 
as possible. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, George McGhee 
stated: "The US Joint Chiefs of Staff had in 1947, recognized officially that the security 
of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East was vital to our security. It also became 
US policy that we should be prepared to make full use of our political, economic, and if 
necessary, military power to defend this area.”. " Significantly, another fundamental 
concept was introduced to describe the purpose of US policy against Soviet menace. In 
an article published in July 1947, George Kennan stressed the need for "a long term, 
patient but firm containment o f Russian expansive tendencies.”. Subsequently, the
11
term “containment” was adopted to describe the aim of US policy in its dealings with 
the Soviets.
Apparently, the real division between the West and Soviets came in 1947, over 
Greece. Following the end of the WW II, Greece, on the fringes of the Middle East, 
emerged as an important country in this area. Since its liberation by the British forces in 
1944, Greece had been torn by a civil conflict between nationalists and a group of 
Soviet supported communist guerrillas. In 1946, as a result of elections, the royalists 
formed a government and a plebiscite favoured the return of the King. Civil war 
then broke out again. On 24 February 1947, the British Ambassador to Washington, 
Sir Oliver Franks told the Secretary of State that Britain, due to its financial problems, 
could no longer assist the Greek army in the civil war against the communists. The 
United Kingdom explained the necessity for the replacement of its aid with that of the 
US. In effect, Britain had started to pursue a policy of regular withdrawal from its 
global status. A scholar of Middle Eastern affairs argued that as Britain was forced 
to abondon its ""self imposed role as arbiter” in the region, the US ''felt obliged 
to return and assume” many British commitments lest the region fall under Soviet 
influence.
The British appeal for US contribution to Middle Eastern security precipitated a 
comprehensive policy to be initiated by the United States. This was the Truman 
Doctrine and large economic and military missions were established in Athens 
and smaller ones in Ankara to transfer US $ 750 million worth of military and 
economic assistance. In other words, with its part regarding aid to Turkey, the Truman 
Doctrine became the first direct involvement of the US in Middle Eastern defense 
policies.
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In January 1948, a shocking incident forced the British foreign policy makers to 
re-consider the threats towards Britain’s position in the Middle East. This was the 
failure of Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (The Portsmouth agreement). Following mass 
demonstrations in Iraq, some of the worst violence took place in the aftermath of this 
agreement between the British and Iraqi governments which sought to extend the 1930 
Anglo-Iraqi treaty in the guise of revising it. To ensure the extension of the 1930 treaty 
had great importance for Britain. This treaty was drawn up to safeguard the essential 
features of the British order before the expiry of the mandate by October 1932, and 
would provide Britain a legal basis for its continuing presence in the country. However, 
to Britain’s disappointment, with the resignation of the Salih Jabr government, the 
treaty negotiations were suspended indefinetely. To add to the instability of the region, 
in May 1948, shortly after the British withdrawal, the war in Palestine erupted. At this 
juncture, Britain precipitated its policy of forming a defence organisation to safeguard 
its position in the region. As it will be discussed under the subsequent title, this defence 
body was to include the US, France and Turkey.
(2.3) The Tripartite Declaration, the Four-Power Treaty, and the 
Formation of the Middle Eastern Defense Organisation
Much due to the historical evaluation, the importance of the Middle East to the 
US was determined to a large extent by its importance to the United Kingdom. 
Apparently, the US held no colonies in Africa and in Asia compared to those held by 
the British. But, the US interest in the region was great because of its strategic position 
and control of air routes. Moreover, both the US and UK depended on Middle Eastern 
oil. As another essential point, the US found advantegous to support nationalism in the 
region against the spread of communism, although this was not always friendly to
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British and American interests. At that time, this view was also shared by Britain. 
Superintending Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Michael Wright, in his 
talks to the US officials, approved that it should be the joint objective of the US and UK 
to convert the nationalism of the Middle Eastern countries into friendly force.
In October-November 1949, at the meeting of US Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions 
of the Middle East in Istanbul, the major issues were; Soviet propoganda activities, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict (with a US emphasis on remainig impartial between Arabs and the 
Israelis), two recent Syrian coups and the prospects of a Syrian-Iraqi union. At the 
same time, the implications of the Point Four program (expressing Razmara’s principal 
decisions) in Iran on the nationalisation of the Iranian oil were also discussed. Here, the 
Soviet pressure on Iran and the future of Iranian oil and in a broader sense, the oil 
reserves in the Middle East were discussed with regard to as to how much US aid 
would be adequate for the Middle Eastern countries against the Soviet threat. In his 
expression of reasons for the calling of the conference, the Under-Secretary for Near 
Eastern Affairs, George McGhee pointed out to the emergence of the Middle East as a 
key area in the world which became subject to a wide struggle between the West and 
the Soviet Union. He argued that the US as a latecomer in the area, needed to 
coordinate its efforts with those of the British to prevent the creation of a vacuum which 
could be exploited by the communists. Accordingly, it was decided to entrench a 
strong and popular resistance to communism. At the same meeting, concerning the 
initial steps to build a regional bulwark against the communist threat, the resolution 
adopted on 22 October 1949, called for a collective security pact among the Arab states. 
However, with regard to Western position in the pact, it was concluded that, ''the 
proposed pact would not likely to have any significant effect, and did not require a
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definite position by the US.”. Besides, the conference did not recommend the 
extension of military assistance to Middle Eastern states outside of the present military 
assistance program, except aid to Saudi Arabia to a certain extent, with the 
authorisation of the U.S. Congress. Overall, this conference was an introductory phase 
of Western policy making in the Middle East. As McGhee stated, “The Conference did 
not result in any startling policy recommendations. It is included mainly as a point of 
reference to our changing attitudes toward the Middle East”.
Another consideration of the Anglo-American officials was the preservation of 
the British presence in Egypt. In January 1950, George McGhee expressed to his British 
counterpart the view that; “It did not seem wise to consider evacuating British troops 
from Egypt under present circumstances, Russian aggression in the Near East was 
entirely possible and it would be essential to our common strategic plan to have the 
British on the spot”.
When Wafd assumed power again in Egypt in the same month, trying to assure 
the American support on the Wafd regime, the new Egyptian Foreign Minister, 
Muhammad Salah el-Din, told the American Ambassador that Egypt had no intention of 
attacking Israel. ** To stabilize the region through accommodating an adequate truce 
between Israel and Egypt, and to perpetuate the Western strategic interests in the 
region, the British and the Americans sought ways to embrace Egypt into a joint 
defense body. In February 1950, to convince Egypt to join a defense body, Britain 
agreed to sell this country arms and munitions including jet-fighters. As expected, Israel 
asked for similar war equipment from the US. Regarding the Israeli demands for 
military assistance, although the US had initially chosen to avoid any commitments in 
the region, domestic pressures were forcing the US to change this policy.
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In May 1950, Foreign Office Under Secretary, Michael Wright, draw attention 
to the possibility of making a Middle Eastern defence pact, probably to be linked to 
NATO. He considered that this would also remove the deadlock in the Anglo-Egyptian 
talks. But, the Near Eastern Affairs officials of the State Department declined this 
project, which would force to extend the obligations of the US under NATO to the 
Middle East, and stated that the area lacked a ''power center on the basis of which a 
pact could be built”.
Having regarded the weak possibility of forming a joint defense body in the 
Middle East, the US and Britain together with France launched a project to limit 
the flow of arms to the countries in the region. On the other hand, the officials at 
Pentagon initially opposed the idea of making a declaration, because it might represent 
an undertaking of the US to use force against aggression in the Middle East. Secretary 
of Defense, Louis Johnson, “implored” the Secretary of State Dean Acheson to refrain 
from any declaration that might "have adverse military implications for the United 
States”. Despite the reservations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department 
officials drafted the declaraton in May. On 12 May, Raymond A. Hare, a State 
Department official involved in a study group on British-US actions in the Middle East, 
expressed the British officials that the US considered the declaration "an important 
development of which it seem seems important to take advantage”. On 25 May 1950, 
the Tripartite Declaration by the US, Britain and France recognized the existing Middle 
Eastern frontiers. The Tripartite Declaration by the principal Western powers involved 
in the Middle East was an expression of these powers of their determinaton to 
lean on their security interests in the area. In essence, through the Tripartite 
Agreement these countries aimed to coordinate the supply of arms to regional states
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which were under an embargo imposed by the UN after the May 1948 Arab-Israeli 
war. The British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Nutting, himself held 
the view that:
Under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, . . . three powers were 
alone responsible for preventing either side from starting another 
‘round’ in the Arab-Israeli struggle, and there was was every reason 
why this responsibility should be more widely shared. I had in mind a 
form of permanent U.N. police force stationed on Israel’s borders.
This would relieve us of the obligation-which could all too easily arise 
in the inflamed state of Arab-Israeli relations-of having to fight 
against an Arab state, such as Jordan, with whom we had a tretay of 
alliance. It would also enable us to reduce or withdraw our forces 
from Jordan or elsewhere in the Middle East if either political or 
military requirements demanded it.
The US assurance for the implemantation of the tenets of the Declaration was 
remarkably great. The New York Times described the Declaration as: “A great and 
welcome step in the ’total diplomacy’ which must be the goal of the west....The lack of 
a unified Western policy on the Middle East has been one of the worst gaps in the battle 
lines of the Cold War....this new move is just and wise and it will strength the West in 
the global struggle." The repercussions of the Declaration were also prospective. 
The Israeli Foreign Office expressed its satisfaction by the Western pledge to oppose 
Arab aggression against Israel. The Lebanese deemed it ‘a freeze’ in the status quo. 
The Egyptian nationalists condemned the declaration, because it realized the foreign 
control of Egyptian arms acquisition, however. King Farouk and the Foreign Minister, 
Mohammed Salaheddin, stated their approval and most press commentary was 
supportive. The Syrian Prime Minister considered it primarily good. Significantly, 
initial reactions of the Arab League were moderate.
In October 1950, with the launching of the US’ “Outer Ring” strategy 
concerning Greece, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, joint Anglo-American efforts to
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coordinate their policies were accelareted. The US Chief of Staff, Omar Bradley, stated 
that in war time Britain would be in a position to hold the area without American 
assistance. This was a clear remark of US comprehension of Britain’s significance 
in the Middle East and the appreciation of collaborating with it in the region. 
Subsequently, in the second US Chiefs of Mission Conference in Istanbul in 14-21 
February 1951, a Middle Eastern Defense Pact was rejected. But, the considerations 
continued for the formation of a regional defense organisation. At this stage, on 18 
July, the new British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, publicly announced 
UK’s support for the admittance of Greece and Turkey to NATO. In addition, at the 
State Department, the idea of creating a common Middle Eastern Defense Board 
including US, UK, France and Turkey was welcomed. Consequently, the Middle 
Eastern Defense Organisation (MEDO) and the Middle Eastern Command (MEC) 
were established. Shortly afterwards, the ambassadors of the United States, Britain, 
France and Turkey drafted the Four-Power proposals for a Middle Eastern Command 
to Egypt. With these proposals it was aimed to stress that “‘Egypt belonged to 
the free world and in consequence, her defense and that of the Middle East in general is 
equally vital to other democratic nations. ” Therefore, the proposal was designed to 
invite Egypt to participate in the Allied Middle East Command on the basis of equality 
and partnership. The US strongly supported the proposals, because it was asserted 
that the proposals offered the best prospect of relieving the present tension in 
Egypt. Furthermore, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson stated that 
^fMEDO] will give Egypt and other Arab states something more productive to think 
about than their feud with Israel and thus pave the way for an eventual peace 
settlement”.
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Before the Four-Power Treaty was concluded, due to the increasing anti-British 
sentiment in Egypt, a British effort in April 1951, to realize joint defense arrangements 
and British retention of the military base at Suez had failed. Subsequently, the policy 
planning staff developed another plan. This was centered on a Supreme Allied 
Commandment with its headquarters in Cairo. The base at Suez would be turned over 
to Egypt, and all British forces not allocated to the Supreme Commandment would be 
withdrawn. By such clauses, it was hoped to transform the character of remaining 
British forces from “occupiers” to “defenders”.
Concerning the integration of British policy to that of US, some low-points were 
appearing. In fact, beneath the surface of a cordial relationship, there remained 
principal differences between the American and British outlooks. The American 
view was that the British should sacrifice Sudan in return for the Egyptian 
participation in the Middle East Defense Organisation. In other words, the US 
policy was based on the satisfaction of both Western military needs and 
Egyptian aspirations. On the contrary, the British view was that the American appeals 
were undermining British interests in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt and in 
Sudan. An Egyptian scholar further argued that, by establishing the Middle East 
Defense Organisation, the US aimed to change Britain’s position in Egypt “/rom that of 
an imperial power to that of a surrogate for America, and the British military presence 
in Egypt would become an integral part o f American global strategy". On the British
side, despite the State Department suggestion for the recognition of King Farouk 
as King of Sudan as well, the oppositionist Conservative party leader, Winston 
Churchill, in conformity with the backbench Conservatives, was emphasizing the 
necessity of maintaining British presence in Egypt and in Sudan. Churchill evaluated
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this as a must in Britain’s Middle Eastern position. In its turn, although it continued to 
support British position in Suez, the US did not believe that the Suez Canal base 
agreement should be linked to Sudan at the same time. Given this fact, the Americans 
were also continuing their efforts to persuade Egypt not to abrogate its treaty with the 
UK. Regardless of the Anglo-American efforts, the Anglo-Egyptian relations were 
further complicated when the Egyptian Prime Minister, Nahas Pasha, rejected the 
British suggestions for Egypt’s agreement with the Four-Power statements. On 13 
October 1951, as the Commander of the Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb stated, ''aware 
of the proposals about to be submitted to it”, Wafd government’s Prime Minister Nahas 
Pasha rejected the British led proposals. On 15 October, the Egyptian Parliament 
adopted decrees unilaterally abrogating both the 1936 treaty and the Anglo-Sudan 
Condominium, and Farouk was declared King of Egypt and Sudan. Not surprisingly, 
Britain refused to accept these proclaimed abrogations. The situation continued to 
deteriorate with increasing guerrilla attacks in the Canal Zone. On 18 January 1952, the 
State Department urged King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia to precipitate mediatory efforts 
between Britain and Egypt. On the same day, in a Cabinet meeting. Dean Acheson 
stated that, "the US is backing the British position in the Egyptian crisis”. The 
forthcoming events were to show that all the mediatory actions were in vain. On 25 
January, a battalion of Egyptian police force in Tel el-kebir, at Ismailia, was 
surrounded by British troops and were called upon to surrender. The Egyptian Minister 
of the Interior ordered them to resist. Within a couple of hours, fifty Egyptians were 
killed. News of the event in Cairo, caused a wave of violence. The massacre of 
several dozen Europeans and nine Englishmen on 26 January 1952, ”  led Churchill, 
who succeeded to the Prime Ministry after the Labour government’s fall in the October
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1951 elections, to warn King Farouk that British forces would move out from their 
Suez Base to reoccupy Cairo and Alexandria if Egypt did not protect British lives 
and property. Farouk “promptly” guaranteed this, just six months before the 
outbreak of the Revolution.
(2.4.) The Coup of 23 July 1952
With the dismissal of the Wafd on 28 January 1952, the last phase of the 
old political course in Egypt was opened. In effect, the removal of the Wafd 
did not relieve the tension between Egypt and Britain. Prime Minister Nahas Pasha’s 
successors proved unable to conduct a social programme in the country to restore the 
deteriorated Anglo-Egyptian relations. From January to June 1952, the US government 
acted as an honest broker and asked the Egyptian government not to break its 
diplomatic relations with Britain. In the same period, it focused its attention on 
persuading Britain to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards Egypt. On 16 July 
1952, a week before the coup d’etat, the US ambassador in Cairo, Henry Byroade, told 
his British counterpart that, “the British must understand that we can not blindly 
support them”. On 21 July, Byroade saw the danger that uprisings and disorder 
would escalate to the extent which the Egyptian authorities might not be able to control. 
Forty-eight hours later, the Free Officers overthrew King Farouk’s monarchy and 
grasped the power.
As the dynamics which channeled the developments to the military overtake on 
the 23rd of July were noticed by both the US and UK, the coup itself was nearly 
expected. Interestingly, a scholar argued that Americans had considered the chance of a 
peaceful revolution under King Farouk, “in the hope of forestalling a more extreme 
popular uprising o f uncertain orientation and direction”. Justifying this, early in
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1952, a CIA official, Kermit Roosevelt, was assigned the duty of planning and 
executing a secret project to accomplish, in a sense, a preemptive coup. Roosevelt soon 
reported that, this policy would not be feasible. He was more convinced that the Free 
Officers could make a coup with consequences not detrimental to American or Western 
interests in Egypt and in the Middle East; “i/ia? the officer corps represented the only 
credible alternative to the Farouq regime”. The American decision, in certain 
respects, was a kind of reaction to Wafdist neutrality during the 1951 Korean War. A 
view expressed by George McGhee, in one of his articles in 1951, explains the 
foundations of the American foreign policy towards Egypt in that decade. He stated 
that; ''The events of the Middle East are moving rapidly. The US cannot afford to allow 
the force of neutralism and anti-Western sentiment to gain any further ground”. ”  
Having considered the American attitude, the Free Officers wanted to maintain US’ 
benovelent neutrality towards their coup plan.
With the departure of the king, three major problems faced Gamal Abd-el 
Nasser and the ruling officers. First, they had either to try to improve the old structure 
or devise a new one. Second, the British still had 75.000 troops and £500 million worth 
of installations in the Canal Zone, and as for Sudan , they were working to divide the 
country apart from Egypt for ever. Finally, the economy was stagnant, the conditions 
of poverty, disease, illiteracy and exploitation especially among the peasants who 
formed two-thirds of the population were among the worst in the world.
Again, differences between the US and UK with regard to the new Egyptian 
administration’s programmes were surfacing as it happened in evaluating plans for land 
reform. In general terms, the main difference of opinion here was that while Britain 
was giving support to the status quo, the American approach was to encourage
22
nationalist movements and to cultivate the new leaders to collaborate with the US. The 
US was also trying to distance itself from the impressions of British colonialism. 
However, a cautious policy was pursued by the US, as Britain’s collaboration was 
essential for the Truman administration when the Cold war and the war in Korea were 
at their peak. Apparently, the expansionist aims of the Soviet Union, and Communist 
China had alarmed the West in the Middle East. Given these, to a certain extent, the 
threat perception of the US from the communist designs worked to Britain’s advantage. 
As a result, the Anglo-American cooperation in the region continued. A scholar stated 
that, “f/ie Americans became convinced that the British military presence at the Suez 
base was vital to Western global strategy”.
In this transitional phase, the US government believed that British presence in 
the Middle East had a stabilizing influence avoiding the need of intervention by the US. 
The US would continue to be a strong supporter of any defense organization rather 
than becoming a direct participant in any emerging defense organization. This was in 
conformity with the fact that “ti was still assumed that Britain would bear the burden 
of direct involvement”. However, the US Interdepartmental Committee on the 
Middle East took a more radical approach. On 17 June 1953, John Jernegan of the 
State Department noted that:
To tie ourselves to the tail of the British kite in the Middle East. . . . 
would be to abandon all hope of a peaceful alignment of that are with 
the West. Unless there is marked change in British Policy. . . .  the 
British and ourselves would be driven out competely or. . .  . we would 
have to maintain ourselves in the area by force at heavy material cost 
and even greater cost in terms of moral standing throughout the non- 
European world.
Indeed, these words underlined the dual nature of US policy. Despite its 
references to the existence of cordial relations with Britain, the US had been
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accommodating a critical approach in its attitudes towards the UK. As it will be 
discussed in the following section, the Eisenhower administration clearly adopted this 
line. The new US government launched its Northern Tier project which had the 
principal concept that, the Middle Eastern defense would be assured by indigenous 
forces. Not exactly known to the British, another approach representing this idea, 
named; New Look Strategy, was to be linked with the Northern Tier doctrine. Thus, 
the Americans rejected to commit themselves to form an organisation with the 
British.
(2.5) The Northern Tier Takes to the Stage (1953-1955)
The beginning of the Eisenhower period did not introduce new policies 
regarding anti-communism. However, according to one analyst, “m rhetoric more than 
in action, the new administration was obsessed with the need to prove how its policy 
differed from that of Truman”. Eisenhower and the new Secretary of State, John 
Foster Dulles, defined their approach to the Middle East as “friendly impartiality” 
towards both Israel and the Arab states, as distinct from the policies during Truman’s 
presidency. US policy, in their view, should not be influenced by the pressures of the 
Zionists and personal preferences. In contrast, to maintain a balanced policy “i/te Arab 
interest would be upgraded, Israel would be looked after but downgraded”. Besides, 
the role of the US outside the Atlantic Alliance was revised. This introduced a US 
policy of evaluating the Alliance in areas outside NATO on a “case by case” basis. 
Additionally, Dulles classically stated his notions against the spread of communism and 
also emphasized that the peace and the security of the free world would be ensured by 
the United States’ leadership.
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As another feature of the American strategy, Eisenhower and Dulles still aimed 
to realize MEDO. Eisenhower and British Foreign Secretary Eden, agreed in March 
that MEDO remained a key objective. But, shortly afterwards, Dulles decided that 
MEDO could not be achieved. He considered that states north of Egypt would provide a 
more reliable basis for action. Since Turkey had joined NATO in March 1952, 
''Pentagon officials had been considering the merits of a forward defense along the 
Turkish-Iranian-Pakistani frontier, but their ideas remained undeveloped until Dulles 
shifted the State Department’s attention to the north in early 1953. ”
In the spring of 1953, Dulles made his historical visits to six Arab countries in 
addition to Israel, Turkey and Pakistan. Prior to Dulles’ expedition, on 6 May 1953, 
the Arab foreign ministers, following a meeting, had stated their support for Egypt, and 
called upon Britain to withdraw its forces from Egypt without any precondition. On 
11 May, Dulles arrived in Cairo. Four days before his arrival in Cairo, he had received 
a confidential message from Winston Churchill, requesting the US to suspend its 
military assistance to Egypt. Given this fact, Dulles had three fundamental purposes in 
his mind; first, the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, second, the 
“Containment” of Soviet penetration to the region through a security pact, and thirdly, 
to realize an effective balance in US foreign policy in mediating the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Dulles had the impression, however, that many of the Arab peoples "are more 
fearful of Zionism than communism” and "they were so enfulged in their quarrels 
with Great Britain and France that they paid little heed to the Soviet threat”. 
Moreover, as a scholar stated, Dulles had reached the conclusion that “the heartland” of 
the Middle East was not ready for a military alliance centered on Egypt. Particularly in 
Egypt, he realized that there was strong opposition to foreign involvement. Previously,
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on 16 January 1953, the Egyptian President, General Naguib, had repeated the Egyptian 
aim of ''driving foreign troops out of the Nile Valley unconditionally, and to liberate it 
from any kind o f political, economic or social colonization”. What Dulles was faced 
was not different from these. The Egyptian statements included messages which 
required the US to revise its policies.
At the end of May 1953, having switched his attention to the Northern Tier 
project, Dulles returned from his mission. He had also concluded that an Arab-Israeli 
peace settlement was not possible in the existing conditions either. He stated the 
necessity of improving relations with Syria and Saudi Arabia, and recommended Britain 
to conciliate with Egypt regarding the Suez Canal Base. He submitted a comprehensive 
report to Eisenhower, assessing the Anglo-Egyptian dispute and his personal analysis of 
it. He suggested that, "the United States must convince the British to relax their 
position". His conclusion included some negative assertions as well, for instance, he 
stated: "the days when the Middle East used to relax under the presence of British 
protection are gone” and "such British troops as are left in the area more a factor of 
instability rather than stability”. He recommended that the US should act 
independently of British policies as well. The US had started to pursue a different 
pattern in its relations with the Middle Eastern countries , specifically with Egypt.
Regarding Britain, "Churchill and Eden sought to stress their hand by bringing 
the United states directly into negotiations, but Nasser stubbornly resisted this, and both 
Eisenhower and Dulles refused to join the talks without Egyptian consent”. Indeed, 
there were outstanding differences of opinion between the British Foreign Minister, 
Eden and his American counterpart, Dulles which surfaced with the latter’s report. On 
a broader perspective, after his return to the US, Dulles wanted to resolve the problems
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which prevented the realization of a Middle Eastern security pact. According to him, 
it had become evident that rather than concentration on the Suez base, the defense of the 
area called for several bases in the Northern Tier. The Anglo-American political 
outlooks with their contradicting assumptions, thus, remained unchanged. In June 1954, 
Churchill and Eden visited Washington D.C. The talks held in Washington were 
successful regarding Indochina and the latest Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. For the time 
being, the Anglo-American policies were once more coordinated in the Middle East.
By then, the Northern Tier defense grouping to include Iran, Iraq, Turkey, 
Pakistan and perhaps Syria appeared to be possible in the views of US policy makers, 
while, ""the rest of the Middle East presented a pact-makers nightmare”. 
Subsequently, it was announced that, an amount of US $ 50 million would be allocated 
to Northern Tier states. Turkey’s agreement to the Turco-Pakistani Pact, proposed by 
the US followed this. The US also considered the British position in enforcing the 
Northern Tier plan to be significant. Correspondingly, British policies were also related 
to the renewal of existing Anglo-Iraqi treaty due to expire in 1957. Therefore, the 
Northern Tier, linking the British presence in Iraq to the new US policy, represented a 
significance for Britain in this sense too.
In its turn, the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council felt unable to firmly 
stand against the new joint Anglo-American policy. In some respects, the time had 
come by February 1954 for the Egyptian military to pronounce further its political 
intentions. However, General Naguib’s resignation on 25 February, following his 
disagreement with RCC members over matters of policy and the allocation of authority 
alarmed some of the army officers and indicated that the ranks of the RCC were 
divided. The Cavalry Corps officers, commanded by Major Khaled Muhieddin, led a
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demonstration in favour of Naguib and subsequently, Nasser himself held a talk with 
those officers. As a result, Naguib was brought back to the Presidency three days later. 
The incident encouraged disaffected political groups (primarily the Wafdists, Socialists, 
Communists, Muslim Brethren) to increase their courting with General Naguib. In the 
meantime, the RCC appointed Nasser Military Governor of Egypt. Facing such 
attempts, Nasser gradually employed tactics to disarm his enemies. By March of that 
year, he announced a decision to restore parliamentary formations, and ordered the 
release of certain political prisoners. Lured by the RCC’s relaxation of suppressive 
measures, the civilian political forces together with the loyal Free Officers, launched 
the Liberation Rally, controlled by Secretary-General Nasser. The demonstrations of 
25-27 March in Cairo and Alexandria and the ensuing general strike in some public 
services, were combined with the protest of Free Officers against the proposed 
relinquishing of authority by the RCC. On 28 March, the RCC announced the 
indefinite cancellation of the proposed June elections for a constituent assembly, 
and ousted General Naguib from the Presidency. On the other hand, the removal of 
Naguib and the victory of Nasser did not lead to a more stable political atmosphere 
in Egypt. While the RCC retained Naguib as symbolic President of the Republic to 
placate public sentiment as well as Sudanese feelings (Naguib was half Sudanese) it 
tried to restore its influence in the country. However, Nasser was determined to gain 
absolute control and on 15 April, issued a decree in the name of the RCC depriving all 
those Wafdists, Liberal Constitutionalists, and Saadists who held various cabinet posts 
between 1942 and 1952, of their political rights for ten years. His cabinet of 18 April 
featured most of the Free Officers loyal to him.
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Turning back to discussion around the Northern Tier, Nasser was alarmed with 
the Turco-Iraqi rapproachement as he perceived it to be against his own interest. Hence, 
he had every reason to oppose the Northern Tier’s transformation into the Baghdad 
Pact. Nasser did not share Dulles’ anti-communism nor saw the Soviets as a threat to 
his people or the rest of the Arab world. He was primarily preoccupied with the Israeli 
raids of reprisal, ''and the Zionist enemy just across the Canal”. Moreover, the 
Americans had rejected the requests of Nasser to purchase weaponry for his forces 
because Churchill had intervened personally with Eisenhower. At Dulles’ mediatory 
attempts, the British had delivered sixteen Centurion tanks to Cairo as part of a 
shipment the Egyptians had already paid for, "but were holding back the rest as 
a carrot with which to tempt Nasser into the Baghdad Pact”. But, this strategy never 
worked to bring about the desired ends. Instead, Nasser chose to send out negotiators to 
buy arms in Belgium, Switzerland, and Holland, however, with meager results.
When the British approach to Iraq became apparent, Nasser launched his counter 
diplomacy. First, he sent his Minister of Guidance, Salah Salem, on a tour of Arab 
states in the summer of 1954. At this stage, rather than trying to overthrow his 
opponent, Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri As-Said, Nasser was looking for ways to improve 
Egypt’s relations with Iraq which had been unfriendly since As-Said’s, “Fertile 
Crescent” scheme had been ditched in the early 1940s in favour of an Arab League 
centered on Cairo. In his negotiations with Nuri As-Said, King Feisal and the Crown 
Prince Abdullah, at Sarsank, Salem before all emphasized Egypt’s opposition to Iraq’s 
getting involved with NATO. He stated Egyptian government’s anxieties concerning the 
promotion of a common Arab League policy to be linked with NATO. He insisted that 
it would be advisable not to get "entangled in any foreign commitments”. He put
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forward that this would also prevent the West from playing one Arab state against 
another. As-Said’s objection was based on the communist threat. In his turn, Salem 
replied that engaging in foreign pacts would be the strongest invitation for communism. 
He further argued that should Iraq be engaged in such pacts, nationalists would also 
resent this ''''subservience to imperialism”. Facing the determination of As-Said, 
Salem raised another issue. He stated that as the proposed pact would link Iraq with 
NATO and since Iraq was a member of the Arab League, it was the assumption of 
Nasser that, this would put the League’s neutrality at risk. He made his point that such 
an irresponsible engagement, in any unpredictable circumstance could involve the 
League’s members in NATO’s disputes should Iraq get involved. On the contrary, Iraqi 
Prime Minister saw every reason to join this British initiative. Certainly, by consenting 
to Britain’s proposal, Iraq would obtain large quantities of arms supplies. Apparently, 
this embittered Nasser more. He was rather disturbed that Iraq, which strengthened its 
military arsenal, added to its rich oil reserves, ‘'would become the predominant Arab 
power and in consequence the center of political gravity in the Middle East would shift 
from Cairo to Baghdad”.
Nasser considered that Britain, having been forced to abandon its bases in Egypt 
was trying “to stage a re-entry on the Arab scene via Iraq”. Contrary to Nasser’s 
expectations, when it came to a joint statement, Nuri As-Said outwitted Salem. Salem 
returned to Cairo with a statement expressing that Egypt and Iraq would examine the 
ways of strengthening the Arab League and would hold talks with the US and Britain to 
this end. However, Nasser was even more disturbed that Salem should have given his 
acknowledgement to the idea that Iraq and Egypt should consult the West about the 
Arab League. He further argued that such an approach would further weaken the league
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by encouraging the imperialists to prolong and strengthen their grip on the Arabs to 
play them off against each other”. “
Despite the fact that British concentration on the Suez Canal base to be held as 
the pivot of Britain’s Middle Eastern position had been its main strategy for more than a 
half century, on an account of recent developments in Egypt, the British Foreign 
Minister, Eden, decided to shift Britain’s strategic Middle Eastern center from Cairo to 
Baghdad and Amman. Hence, forces were deployed to Libya, Jordan, Cyprus and 
Aden. “  Meanwhile, the US enlarged its already outstanding nuclear arsenal with the 
inclusion of the Hydrogen Bomb. When the deployment of allied forces in Cyprus, 
Libya, the Persian Gulf and in Jordan was negotiated in Washington in December 1953, 
the discussions also comprised the stocking of military equipment in southern Turkey to 
support Middle Eastern defense. Following the changes in war technology, the 
positioning of nuclear weaponry was also planned. Against this background, the Anglo- 
Egyptian treaty, regulating the maintenance of Suez Canal base with civilian technicians 
was ratified on 27 July 1954. When the UK agreed, through the mediatory efforts of the 
US, to start withdrawing its garrison of eighty thousand troops from the Suez Canal 
base, Churchill asked Dulles why he was so interested to ensure such an agreement in 
favour of the RCC of Egypt. Dulles told Churchill that, “zi will restore Egyptian pride 
and strengthen the Egyptian position, so that she can in future play a leading role in the 
Middle East”. Churchill replied that, "‘Anything in which Egypt plays a leading 
role, means trouble”. “  From the statement of Dulles, it can be understood that, the 
US Secretary of State was still considering to include Egypt in the new security 
organisation in one way or another. But, the US rejection of Egyptian arms requests, 
combined with Nasser’s increasing anxieties that the Zionist enemy just across the Canal
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might endanger his regime, were the essential factors which remained unchanged, 
leading to Egypt’s opposition against the new defense formation.
In the meantime, the US had extended its military aid to Iraq by April 1954.
Indicating the reservations of the British government about the US military aid to
Pakistan within the Middle Eastern Defense scheme, a memorandum dated 5 January
1954 by the British Foreign Secretary stated that:
The US Ambassador in Ankara has told the Turkish Government o f the 
proposed military aid for Pakistan and suggested that the Turks should 
propose military conversations to Pakistan. What is suggested is not a 
treaty of alliance, but some form of joint planning in which other 
Middle Eastern states particularly Iraq and eventually Persia, might 
later take part but from which the United States and other Western 
powers would be excluded. . . . The Turkish Prime Minister’s initial 
reaction to this suggestion is understood to have been favourable.
Interestingly, at first the British Foreign Secretary was doubtful whether the 
State Department’s project would have useful or practical results, given the Middle 
Eastern countries’ perception of the role of Western states in the defense of the area.
In fact, this was related to the British efforts for the renewal of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Suez Canal Agreement. Having granted the top priority to accomplish this, British 
policy makers would not welcome any other option to divert attention from their desire 
for a lasting presence over the Suez.
In this forum, although the Northern Tier was basically the creation of Dulles, 
oddly, when Turkey and Pakistan (which were countries receiving US aid) stated their 
plan to form a pact, the US decided not to join the new alliance for the time being. In 
another perspective, the US was already committed to the security of Turkey through 
NATO. Additionally, it continued to provide support for the enhancement of 
Britain’s regional role. On 2 April 1954, Turkey and Pakistan signed the above 
mentioned military pact. In September, Pakistan joined the the Southeast Asia
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Collective Defense Treaty, playing another role in the defense belt that the US created 
from Europe to the Far East.
As for Iran, after the assasination of Prime Minister Ali Razmara (former
General), by Fada’iyan-i Islam, an extremist religious group, which threathened to
nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), peaceful settlement of the dispute
between Britain and this country was jeopardized. The Four Point introduced by
Razmara comprised a ten-year Iranization program for the AIOC, and his moderation
was favourable to the US. However, the open support that Razmara had given the
company discredited him in the public eye, and he was accused by the press.™ The
Shah, also could not prevent the failure of the AIOC, which came upon the assasination
of Razmara. With Razmara’s death, resistance to Dr. Muhammad Musaddeq and the
National Front collapsed. In expressing common points with Britain, the US found the
nationalisation of oil concessions as distasteful as Britain had. Britain had agreed
with the US suggestion of a fifty-fifty profit sharing model, but did not leave any room
for nationalization. The basic difference between the policies of the US and UK over
nationalization prevailed here. The US notion had been based on the acceptance of the
UK for greater control of Iran in the AIOC, which would allow Iran to obtain increased
benefits from its petroleum. Looking back to the period 1951-53, in the years when
Muhammad Musaddeq was in power, US had pursued a policy without any close
interaction as well. However, the US policy which kept itself distant from the Anglo-
Iranian dispute eventually failed. In the next three years, the nationalist government,
bitterly attacked the AIOC, and the Shah was forced to leave the country. A senior
State Department official reminisced;
. . . .  our lack of trust both in motives and abilities, and fear of 
offending the British who considered him [Mussadeq] an enemy kept 
us from any close association. . . . Unable to perceive any alternative
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to the Shah, whether we wanted or not, we seemed to destined to 
support himjblindly and on his terms_until we both went down in Iran 
together.
In view of a stalemate on negotiations, the Iranian Prime Minister, Muhammad 
Mussadeq had led the Iranian nationalists and nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company. In 1953, the overthrow of Mussadeq by the CIA, can be evaluated as the 
first significant incident that indicated the Anglo-American sensitivity against violation 
of joint assets.
However, when an Anglo-American Agreement was reached on the proposals to 
President Neguib of Egypt on the Suez Canal base, despite the still fresh memory of 
Britain’s disputes with Mussadeq, again some differences in policies pursued by the US 
and UK surfaced;
The US Embassy in Cairo, supported by the State Department, now 
argued that the points of package agreed in January between Byroade 
and British officials were not interdependent. The US might push 
Britain into a settlement on the Suez Canal without ensuring Egypt’s 
commitment to the Middle Eastern Defence Organization.
The British, once they concluded the Canal Zone Agreement with Nasser in 
October 1954, “hoped to be friends with everyone in a westward facing Middle 
East”. On the other hand, in part, due to Eden’s evaluations of the half-hearted 
Egyptian approval, the agreement over the Suez Canal was followed by Eden’s two 
initiatives. One of them was based on the Northern Tier idea presented by Dulles. 
Considering this, the Foreign Office planned that Egypt’s self-exclusion would be based 
on the Northern Tier plan. Secondly, it was aimed to reach a solution on the 
Palestine problem. This was built on the talks of the British Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Anthony Nutting with Nasser at the Nile Dam concerning future 
bilateral relations in the context of -NECMU- the New Era of Cooperation and Mutual
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Understanding. The first initiative was evolved in the Baghdad Pact, and the second 
came to be known as ALPHA project, which was a secret plan. ’’ At this juncture, 
these policies appeared to be contrary to each other. Truly, the Baghdad Pact as it will 
be further discussed, in effect excluded Egypt, whereas ALPHA was concerned with 
ensuring Egyptian involvement in seeking a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. 
Others, however, argue to the contrary, and correlate the ALPHA Project with the 
Baghdad Pact. For instance, Nigel Ashton stated that, if Arab-Israeli tensions could be 
defused, the Arab states might be prepared to turn their attention outwards and join “a 
renewed Nothern Tier Pact”. Consecutively, by the beginning of 1955, Henry 
Byroade was appointed Ambassador to the American Embassy in Cairo (replacing 
Jefferson Caffery), along with launching the ALPHA project.
Regarding Egypt, when a member of the Muslim Brethern tried to assasinate 
Nasser in Alexandria on 26 October 1954, Nasser moved to mollify the organisation 
completely. The trial of the assasins in November implicated Naguib. He was removed 
from his office and placed under house arrest. Having crushed the influence of the 
Muslim Brethern and with the elimination of Naguib, Nasser became able to appoint 
trusted officers in key positions. “Within the RCC and the Free Officers group, personal 
loyalty to Nasser soon became the criterion for political longevity”.
Dulles’ expectation that he might succeed to establish stronger links between the 
Northern Tier and the Arab League led him to take another step. To this end, he 
decided that the US should promote the Military Defense Assistance Act (MDAA). In 
the beginning, within the context of MDAA, Americans indicated an enthusiasm to send 
military advisers and an unspecified number of troops to Egypt. But, Nasser stressed 
that this was not acceptable after the agreement that brought an end to British
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occupation. It can be stated that the practical situation was against his assumptions, 
regarding the fact that Egypt was receiving US aid and the CIA was training Egyptian 
officers.
With regard to Anglo-Egyptian relations, despite the renewed Anglo-Egyptian 
treaty, British relations with Egypt were deteriorating. The reason behind this was 
Nasser’s principal rejection of the presence of foreign troops in Egypt. As regards the 
American pressure for military cooperation, Nasser stated the pre-condition of an Arab- 
Israeli settlement. He also stressed his view that, the Unified Arab Command should be 
established without any foreign influence. Given these, here, it can be concluded that 
Nasser intensified his opposition to halt the Western influence and Iraq’s inclination to 
the Baghdad Pact under the Anglo-phile As-Said regime against the joint Anglo- 
American initiatives.
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Ill THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BAGHDAD PACT
(3.1) The Baghdad Pact: “An Illustration of Collaborative Policy At its 
Best” ‘ (April 1955)
The September 1954 elections in Iraq had brought back to power the Anglo­
phile Nuri As-Said. Iraqi Prime Minister’s first aim was to renew the Anglo-Iraqi 
treaty. This was rather favourable to Britain as it was in search of an agreement to 
replace the existing treaty due to expire in 1957. With this in mind, the Turkish-Iraqi 
Defense Pact, going beyond the formal general staff conversations and the decision to 
provide free transit of military equipment were of significance for the British and 
American policy makers. In early January 1955, the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes arrived in Baghdad with a large group of delegation which included his 
Foreign and Communications Ministers and nine members of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly. A couple of days later, on 13 January, a communique was issued 
which proclaimed that Iraq and Turkey had agreed to sign a mutual defense pact and 
they hoped ""other like-minded states" in the area would join them and they would also 
make ""every endeavour to persuade the states to sign the treaty simultaneously with 
them”. '
While the Turkish Prime Minister was in Baghdad, pan-Arab newspapers in 
other Arab countries tried to hamper the talks urging that the precondition of any 
understanding with Turkey should be a settlement of the question of the sanjak of 
Alexandretta -İskenderun-  ^ and of the Hatay province (which were united with Turkey 
as a result of a plebiscite in 1939) between Turkey and Syria. Additionally, the break 
of economic relations between Turkey and Israel was demanded.
When, on 13 January, the above mentioned Turco-Iraqi Communique announced 
the two governments’ proceeding a defense pact, there was an immediate reaction in 
Egypt. The Egyptian Foreign Minister protested that the Egyptian government had not 
been informed and that Iraq’s action violated the “spirit” of the Arab League. Besides, 
the Egyptian government controlled journal al-Gumhuriyya began a series of personal 
attacks on Nuri As-Said. Replying to this, the Iraqi Ambassadors in Egypt and Lebanon 
expressed to the correspondents that, the pact with Turkey would not be brought to 
existence without consulting the other Arab countries. Certainly, for Iraq, it was of 
importance to justify to the Arab states that its recent actions were not in violation of 
the interests of the Arab League. In this framework, cynically, but not convincingly, 
the Iraqi Director-General of National Orientation, tried to make a point that, Egypt 
had not kept the other Arab states informed on its recent negotiations with Britain. In 
this context, severe attacks from Radio Cairo increased. Subsequently, an Egyptian 
official of the Radio Cairo was expelled from Iraq and tensions remained high. In 
effect, the Egyptian campaign was counter-productive and in consequence, As-Said’s 
policy gained additional support within the Iraqi and Syrian political circles. A 
respected, elder statesman, Tawfiq As-Suwaidi and As-Said’s long standing political 
opponent Salih Jabr also supported the Iraqi Prime Minister.  ^ As for the Turkish 
efforts to include other regional countries in their initiative with Iraq, on 14 January, 
Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and his delegation visited Damascus to draw 
Syria into the Pact. But, the talks were fruitless.
Against a background of Egyptian generated opposition, the British view, highly
in favour of the Turco-Iraqi Pact was as follows:
On 14 January [1955] Eden wrote Nuri that he was ‘much 
encouraged’ by the Turkish-Iraqi announcement and implied that an 
Anglo-Iraqi arrangement should follow. Advised by Michael Wright,
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the British Ambassador in Baghdad, that an Anglo-Iraqi treaty under 
cover o f the Turkish-Iraqi Pact was ‘as solid a basis [of agreement] as 
it is possible to secure’. ^
As a high-ranking British official stated, this was even worse than Nasser had 
feared. Indeed, there were a variety of reasons behind Nasser’s disturbance because, 
“not only Iraq was to form with Turkey the nucleus of a multilateral alliance with 
Britain which would link her with NATO; she was also going to canvass other Arab 
states to join as w e ir . ’ The other fundamental cause for Nasser’s resentment was 
explained by another Middle Eastern scholar as related to his humiliation by the 
Western powers. Indeed, “the West was anchoring its Middle Eastern Policy in Nuri-el 
Said and the Hashemite rulers of Iraq, who were rivals of him for Arab leadership”. * 
It was also underlined that the Arab dimension of Nasser’s policy emerged after the 
Baghdad Pact. ^
In his statement to the UN Chamber of Deputies on 6 February 1955, the Iraqi 
representative. Dr. Fadhil Jamali, clarified the legal aspects of the Baghdad Pact which 
he had also previously expressed in his talks in Cairo. Jamali stated that any Arab 
country might conclude a treaty in accordance with Article II of the Arab Collective 
Security Pact, and Article VII and paragraph 2 of Article X of the Arab League Charter 
stipulated that any country might conclude a special agreement without committing the 
other countries.
On 15 February, the Foreign Office, without waiting for Cabinet’s 
authorisation, informed Iraq and Turkey that, Britain was prepared to accede to the 
Pact. When Eden stopped in Cairo on 15 February on his way to a conference in 
Bangkok of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation, Nasser made his ambitions for the 
leadership of the Arab world explicit. Eden stated in his memoirs that Nasser was not
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open to conviction on the Turco-Iraqi enterprise. He indicated that Nasser considered 
the pact ill-timed and one which would seriously impair effective cooperation between 
the West and the Arab world. Concerning his attacks on Nuri As-Said, Nasser, “‘rather 
naively asserted that, they were an internal Arab affair and needed therefore be no 
concern of the British". “ With this confirmation of the hostile Egyptian attitude, 
Britain decided to extend its support to the Iraqi government. Eden stated that Nuri was 
Britain’s ally and attacks on him could not be ignored as a mere internecine quarrel 
between Arabs. He further emphasized that, although the timing of the new pact might 
be unfortunate for Egypt, it was essential for Britain. It was no surprise that this was 
followed by Eden’s ultimate decision to leave Egypt out of the proposed pact.
A few days after Eden’s talks with Nasser in Cairo, Anglo-Iraqi military talks 
on British requirements in Iraq were concluded with success, on 22 February, two days 
before the finalization of the Turco-Iraqi Pact. In its talks with Britain, Iraq aimed to 
get the British to terminate the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty. This was agreed by Britain, if 
Iraq joined an open-ended collective security pact with Turkey.
On the same day, the Egyptian government convened an extraordinary meeting 
of the Arab League Prime Ministers in Cairo. The Prime Ministers of Syria, Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen and Libya were assembled without Nuri As-Said and his 
Foreign Minister, both of whom pleaded illness, but were refused a postponement by 
Nasser. Here, Nasser had Saudi Arabia, a rich and influential ally, that had currently 
engaged in a dispute with Britain over the possession of the Buraimi oasis, on the 
fringes of the British-protected Trucial Sheikhdoms. Moreover, since King Saud’s 
father, Abdel Aziz Ibn Saud, the founder of the kingdom, had evicted Sherif Hussein 
from the Hejaz in 1924 and annexed this territory to Saudi Arabia, he and his dynasty
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were the enemies of the Hashemites. Thirty years later, Ibn Sand’s successors had been 
still carrying on the vandetta against the grandson of Sherif, Feisal of Iraq and Hussein 
of Jordan. Backed by the Saudis, in the first days of the meeting, Nasser managed to 
control the reactions of League’s members. Therefore, the Iraqi action was generally 
blamed. In the meantime, al-Gumhuriyya continued its attacks on the Iraqi government 
for having become the “‘ally of Israel”. The Iraqis were not represented for the first 
five days and when they finally appeared on the scene they were led by a former Prime 
Minister, Fadhil Jamali, “who was pathologically anti-Egyptian”.
At the meeting, certain divisions of opinion among the League members 
surfaced as well. Syrian representative Fares el-Khoury had opened the meeting with a 
“pedantic” statement that whilst they would not join any foreign alliance, it would be 
pointless for them to oppose the Iraqi government for doing so, since such a decision 
would not bind any future Syrian government. In Syria, there was an apparent 
tension between the conservative People’s party who favoured a union with Iraq and the 
Baath Party’s adherents, who desired a broad Arab union. Therefore, Fares el-Khoury 
felt obliged to disclaim any intention of Joining As-Said’s alliance and in order not to 
frustrate the People’s party he rejected to condemn Iraq. It was clear that Nasser’s 
efforts were not adequate to influence the Syrian public opinion. Besides, his regime 
was disgraced in socio-political circles dominated by the Muslim Brethern, especially 
following the execution of the Brethern leaders associated with the Alexandria 
assasination attempt.
To the disappointment of Nasser, the Jordanians also put forward that though 
they disliked pact with foreigners, they were placed in difficulty to condemn Nuri As- 
Said’s alliance since they depended on Britain’s subsidies regarding the needs of the
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Arab Legion. Moreover, just a few weeks ago, a Jordanian delegation led by Aboul 
Huda had held discussions in London about the revision of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. 
Here, the British had set a condition that any changes in the treaty could only be 
considered as part of a new defense system in the Middle East. In other words, in 
return for British subsidies, Jordan would have to Join the Turco-Iraqi Pact.
Nor were Syria and Jordan alone in their ambivalence. Lebanon, too, was under 
some pressure to join the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The Lebanese delegation to the Cairo 
meeting made the point that the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes had, on leaving 
Baghdad, called in at Beirut "‘to dangle before them the considerable advantages which 
Lebanon would enjoy if she joined the Turco-Iraqi alliance”. Turkey, so Menderes 
had said, had an army of ten divisions with the newest equipment and there were now 
50.000 tractors working on the land, all provided by the US. Menderes had also stated 
that Turkey would support the Arabs against Israel if they agreed to sign up with him 
and Nuri As-Said. Certainly, the Lebanese pro-Western President Camille Chamoun 
was impressed by these statements. He also considered that Turkey should be 
encouraged to side with the Arabs in their conflict with Israel.
Though the arguments of the Syrians, Jordanians and the Lebanese mentioned 
above made a considerable impact on the meeting as a whole, "they failed to convert 
those who had already spoken against condemning Nuri who, they believed, had special 
problems arising from Iraq’s more exposed situation and who should therefore be 
allowed to make whatever arrangements he thought necessary for his security”. ’’ 
Wheras, in the end, Nasser could not completely succeed to foster his idea that, Nuri 
As-Said had rejected to halt his talks with the Turks to enable any alternative to be 
worked out which would strengthen the Arabs. To his disappointment, the Lebanese
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joined the Syrians and the Jordanians in declining to censure the Iraqi initiative. Then, 
Nasser had no other alternative policy to offer. In one of the last moments he suggested 
that Arab League security arrangements should be strengthened through forming a joint 
military command which would coordinate training and manufacture of arms and 
supplies. When Fadhil Jamali stated that Iraq might join in these arrangements, but it 
must still retain its right to enter into whatever foreign alliances it deemed necessary, 
Nasser withdrew his proposal, "acidly remarking that, if the Iraqi reservation were 
accepted, the joint command would extend the Arab League’s commitments further than 
ever. . . ” . Regarding the Turkish government which urged Egypt to put 
considerations of regional defense in the Cold War before national “amour-propre”, 
Turkey was constrained to deny reports emanating from Cairo that it would conclude a 
military pact with Israel.
On 24 February 1955, Turkey and Iraq signed the Mutual Cooperation Pact 
which was opened to all members of the Arab League and states concerned with peace 
and stability in the Middle East. The United Kingdom adhered to this agreement on 
4 April 1955, and terminated the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930. On 5 April 1955, 
Britain’s formal accession turned the Turco-Iraqi Pact into the Baghdad Pact.
Iraq’s inclusion in this pact as the only Arab country increased the verbal attacks 
of Nasser. The Egyptian President blamed Iraq of betraying Arab unity. Nasser’s 
Egypt and Nuri As-Said’s Iraq, with the former standing against the Baghdad Pact and 
with the latter’s commitment to join the Baghdad Pact and to draw other Arab countries 
into it, became the orbit of intra-Arab rival policies. Iraq had been generally opposing 
the alleged Egyptian domination of the Arab League. Thus, Iraq’s participation in the 
Baghdad Pact was explained as the illustration of differences between the two
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countries. The League’s policy assiduously promoted by Egypt, as one of non­
cooperation with the West until the Arab national objectives had been realised, placed 
Iraq and Egypt in opposite camps.
A Turkish scholar stated that though the principal objective of the Baghdad Pact 
was to include all the Middle Eastern countries, in all reality, the pact divided the 
region into three groups of states in which, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran formed the first 
group as the Baghdad Pact states. The opponents of the Pact; Egypt, Syria, Yemen and 
Saudi Arabia formed a second grouping of states, and Jordan together with Lebanon, 
remained in a third group which was excluded from these two. Actually, when 
Britain and United States shifted their emphasis to the Northern Tier project and 
subsequently “fathered” the Baghdad Pact, in its turn, the Arab League Council took 
the official stand that, the Arab Collective Security Pact was adequate for Arab policy 
and no member of the Arab League should become a party to an agreement with a 
Western state that was likely to affect the sovereignty and independence of Arab League 
member states. Nasser’s negative arguments had only affected the anti-Hashimete 
Saudis and their Yemeni neighbours. At the Cairo conference, he had suggested that the 
Arab League security arrangements should be strengthened by the creation of a Joint 
military command. Vaguely, it was put forward that this structure would coordinate 
training, communication and the manufacture of weapons. It would also decide 
members’ peace-time contribution to socio-economic projects and the extent of their 
commitment in time of war. But, as it was mentioned before, Iraqi representative 
Jamali had wrecked this proposal by insisting that the Iraqi government would reserve 
its right to conclude foreign alliances even it might Join an Arab Unified Command. 
Ultimately, Nasser had withdrawn his proposal, and no binding decision was taken.
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As regards the Soviets, at this time Nikita Khrushchev had just emerged as the 
Secretary-General of the Soviet collective leadership. His attention was diverted by 
West Germany which was rearmed adding to the strength of NATO. Therefore, he had 
no time for concentrating on what had been taking place in the Middle East. In this 
context, Dulles and Eden could comfortably contemplate the prospect of Middle Eastern 
countries, in due course, subscribing to the Baghdad Pact. But only four days 
after signing of the Baghdad Pact, an event occurred that could shatter all the 
hopes invested in this new organisation.
On 28 February, the Israeli and Egyptian forces clashed in Gaza. This changed 
the priorities of Nasser’s regime, reminding the case of Palestinian refugees. This was a 
significant issue to manipulate regarding his ambitions for the leadership of the Arab 
world as well. On the other hand, his fears of military weakness surfaced with this 
incident. In fact, while Israelis claimed that they had been attacked first, and this 
was the latest of a series of clashes in this area, it was difficult not to correlate it to the 
Egyptian hanging of two Jews a month ago. Nasser and Israeli Foreign Minister, 
Moshe Share«, had held covert negotiations between 1952 and 1955. These included 
talks with third parties. But, the tension always remained sometimes increasingly, due 
to the Israeli reprisals. Major raids of varying intensity throughout 1954, weakened the 
chance for peaceful settlement. And finally, Ben Gurion’s succession to the Ministry of 
Defense broke the talks with Egypt. Nasser also shifted his policies by supporting 
“fedayeen” attacks against Israel. As regards the outcome of the attacks of February 
1955 on the Gaza Strip, it can be stated that, regardless of the reasons behind them, 
Israeli attacks which were launched few days after the signing of the Turco-Iraqi Pact, 
seriously jeopardized the stability in the Middle East. Moreover, Egyptian propoganda
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hastened to argue that the Israeli attack had been encouraged by the disunity “caused” 
by the Turco-Iraqi Pact, or was even instigated by the US and Britain as they pressed 
the Arab States to accede to that pact. “
Explicitly, Nasser’s defeat in Gaza, led him to assume that he was under 
Western pressure forcing Egypt to participate in the Baghdad Pact, contrary to his 
desire for an Egypt free from any foreign interference, especially that of the British. In 
any event, his scepticism dramatically increased. In addition to this, his rivalry with 
Iraq drove him to determine that he must not appear weak, nor submit to any Israeli 
threat. Nasser considered that his prestige as the leading figure in the Arab world 
against Nuri As-Said would be damaged if he showed any signs of compromise after 
this destructive raid. To make the situation more serious for the Anglo-American policy 
makers, a rather complicated behaviour was to be adopted by Nasser. “Nasser was now 
bent upon using Arab unity under his leadership as leverage to gain more concessions 
from the West and Israel".
In fact, for its own reasons, Israel as well as Egypt was opposing the Baghdad 
Pact. First of all, Israel apparently feared that if British efforts succeded in turning the 
pact into a Middle Eastern asset controlled by Britain, traditionally no friend of Israel’s, 
then the Jewish state would be surrounded by a unified enemy. In the comment by 
the Israeli Foreign Ministry dated on 26 February 1955 on the signature of the Turco- 
Iraqi Pact, it was stated that:
. . . .  the letter signed by the Iraqi Premier, and endorsed by the 
Turkish Premier, states that this new pact is designed to meet 
aggression from any direction. The letter also says, continuing the 
same passage, that, in order to protect peace and security in the 
Middle East, the two parties agree to co-operate to ensure the 
implementation of the UN resolutions. This letter’s hostility towards 
Israel, which is an integral aspect of the alliance, is obvious to 
anybody. This new alliance must encourage aggressive ideas and
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tendencies of hostility to Israel, and, in this way will serve to 
undermine stability and internal security in the Middle East.
Eventually, the Israeli opposition would drag the US into a dilemma; it would 
see the urgent need of backing the Baghdad Pact against Soviet expansion into the 
Middle East, whilst it wanted to maintain its friendly relations with Israel. Another 
reason for the Israeli disturbance was transfer of weapons to Iraq within the framework 
of the Baghdad Pact. Remarkably, a far-sighted evaluation had been made on a probable 
change in the Iraqi administration which could result in Iraq’s leaving collaboration 
with the West, since armaments might be used against Israel. Lastly, with the Israeli 
impressions of the Baghdad Pact being committed to the Arab point of view, it was 
regarded a serious failure. An Israeli scholar took a more radical approach. He stated 
that, ''The Baghdad Pact, instead of creating a barrier against Soviet penetration and 
aggression ‘invited’ such penetration and precipitated the intra-Arab conflict and 
competition for power while as a result the Arab-Israeli conflict entered a new and more 
critical phase. Ultimately, it completed the erosion of British power in the Middle East 
and was among the causes of the revolution in Iraq in July 1958”.
Turning back to Egyptian opposition, the unacceptable thing for Nasser was the 
prominent role of Iraq in the Baghdad Pact. This precipitated his challenges against the 
pact, its participants and its promoters, in order to curb their interests by any means in 
the region, including entering into an arms deal with the Soviets. Additionally, as it will 
be discussed in the next section, it was a fact that Nasser’s action was risk-taking which 
could not be confined to Egypt alone. In certain respects, it jeopardized international 
peace and security in an era which was dominated by the Cold War hostilities. As it will 
be further analysed, an ostensible reason for his resort to Soviet supplies, was the 
condescening Anglo-American attitude towards self-assertiveness in the Middle East and
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their disregard for Egyptian needs for its own security. It may be re-considered that, as 
a pretext to his arms deal, Nasser exploited the tension with Israel, probably to ensure 
military supremacy. In essence, the West was convinced that an adequate quantity of 
arms which would be allocated to the Middle Eastern states was necessary as these 
regimes were in need of arms to protect their internal stability. In this context, there 
was already a flow of arms, supporting the maintenance of stable regimes in the Middle 
East, which would be open to collaborate with the West, in conformity with the Anglo- 
American Middle Eastern policies. However, excessive Egyptian demand for arms was 
considered to be destabilizing for the region.
(3.2) A Notorious” Arms Deal, September 1955
Nasser, pre-occupied with the situation on Gaza and the discussion of the Turco- 
Iraqi Pact, openly asked Britain for the present membership of Baghdad Pact to be 
frozen. The British responded that this should be consulted with other Pact members. 
However, in evaluating the overall position of Egypt, Eden worried about the defeats 
which Nasser’s regime experienced and approved the transfer of arms supplies to 
Egypt. With American interference, a decreased quantity of weaponry was allocated to 
Egypt.
As regards British politics, in April 1955, a change in the British Cabinet took 
place. On 6 April 1955, Winston Churchill retired for the last time, and Anthony Eden 
took his place. The new British Foreign Secretary with whom Dulles now had to deal 
directly was Harold Macmillan, who remained at the Foreign Office for almost a year, 
that is until December 22nd, when he became Chancellor of Exchequer and was 
succeeded by Selwyn Lloyd.
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At the end of April 1955, Nasser left Egypt for the Conference of Afro-Asian 
states at Bandung. There, he found himself seated with Nehru, Chou En-lai, and 
Sukarno. Having failed to ameliorate his relations with the West, Nasser sought support 
from the Asian states. In the Bandung Conference, Nasser was informed by the Chinese 
Premiere Chou En-lai that Soviet supplies were attainable.
In the meantime, Israel was becoming increasingly disturbed with the recent 
developments. In May 1955, the Israeli Prime Minister, Moshe Sharett, asked the US 
for a guarantee of Israel’s borders. The “legal-minded” Dulles took the line that it was 
not possible to guarantee frontiers which had not been agreed on between various 
parties. It was noted in Harold Macmillan’s diary that, “'It is clear that the Americans 
are becoming as worried as we are about the situation in the Middle East. The 
difficulty is to get them to act with any speed. Yet, without them, with our 
slender resources, there is little that we can do”. Given this impression, a very 
serious incident, an arms deal of Egypt with the Soviets, was soon to occur upon the 
warning of Macmillan.
Henry Byroade, who succeeded Caffery as the US ambassador to Cairo in 
February 1955, was primarily assigned the mission to make progress in talks with the 
Egyptians. At that time, Egypt’s concern with receiving arms that its regime needed 
was faced with British and French cuts that indicated an influence on Washington’s 
arms supply decisions. In June 1955, this time, the Egyptian demand for US $ 27 
million worth of arms met with procrastination by the US State Department and 
Pentagon, not to mention the Congress. Concerning US aid, Egypt had rejected a US 
military mission and in response to this the US argued that, it had cotton surplus, 
therefore could not afford to purchase the Egyptian cotton. Thus, Egyptian demands for
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trade exchange were rejected. Additionally, Dulles stated that they would sell weapons 
to both Israel and Egypt since the US was impartial.
Then, Nasser turned to the Soviets. He first accepted a request from the editor 
of Pravda, Dimitri Shepilov, who in the following year was to become Soviet Foreign 
Minister, to visit Cairo. Consecutively, the Soviet Ambassador to Cairo, Daniel Solod, 
told Nasser that the Soviet Union would accept supplying the Egyptian Army with 
weaponry in exchange for cotton and rice. In the same month, the Egyptian President 
told Byroade that, on 23 May, the Soviet Union had offered to supply Egypt with arms, 
and an Egyptian mission would leave for Moscow in the following week. Facing 
Soviet penetration into the region, the US stated that, the acceptance of Soviet arms, 
“would be considered a very serious act”. ”  Besides, Dulles sent a letter to Nasser that 
amounted to “a virtual ultimatum about the continuation of American good will, which 
Nasser contemptuously ignored”. Replying to this, Nasser stated that the US had not 
met Egypt’s demands. Concerning the Soviets, Eden thought to send a personal message 
to the Soviet Prime Minister, Nikolai Bulganin, to show his concern about 
compromising with the Soviets. But, the State Department indicated an opposite 
reaction, because this would create a precedent of consulting the Soviets on Middle 
Eastern issues. As regards coming to an understanding with Egypt, although, some 
foreign officials recommended a limited arms supply to Egypt, Eden had also turned 
against Nasser. Then, the US and British officials produced policies, concerning a 
variety of approaches from coercive measures to bribing or overthrowing Nasser. At 
the same time, it was decided to demonstrate to other Arab countries that Egypt would 
not benefit from this policy. Whereas, no effort would be able to reverse the course 
of the developments proceeding in domino effect.
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On 7 September 1955, Nasser publicly referred to the existence of secret 
Franco-Israeli arms which he alleged, included one hundred French tanks and Mystere 
jet-fighters to Israel. A CIA report dated 19th September, warning of Nasser’s 
agreement with Soviets, was followed by Nasser’s sensational announcement of 
receiving US $ 80 million worth of aid in arms from the Soviets, consisting of 200 
tanks and 100 MIGs and jet bombers. Nasser stated that, having failed to secure arms 
from the West, and facing an Israel secretly arming, Egypt had contracted to buy arms 
through Czechoslovakia in barter for cotton and rice. This specifically changed the 
mode of interactions between Egypt and the super powers. On 30 September 1955, 
Deputy Under Secretary, Harold Caccia, cabled the British Foreign Secretary Harold 
Macmillan, discussing probable policies. ''Caccia argued that a comprehensive 
programme against Egypt ‘might even discredit Nasser to the point where he was 
removed by Egyptian processes alone. . . .  I f this came about, it would have happened 
without our direct interference in Egyptian politics”.
On the other hand, to the Eisenhower administration, it was explained by CIA in 
Cairo and State Department officials that Nasser did not plan to join the communist 
side. Humphrey Trevelyan, now the British Ambassador in Cairo, also commented that 
Nasser’s receiving of Soviet supplies were due to internal pressure and the immediate 
threat following the increasing tension in Gaza. In contrast, P. J. Vatikiotis argued in 
his book. History of Egypt that, Nasser’s and the Soviets’ interests in opposing Western 
policy converged. This asserted Nasser the power of opposing western engagements in 
the Middle East with Soviet support, whilst the Soviet Union thought this to be an 
opportunity to "break up the strategic-political monopoly o f the West in the region”.
In an effort to get Nasser to reverse his policy, Byroade warned him about the outcomes
51
of communism. But, Nasser assured Byroade of being able to handle the communist 
fractions in Egypt.
In Horne’s words, the Soviets used the singularly unmenacing Baghdad Pact ''as 
a pretext to press the arms deal still harder with the Egyptians”. In every aspect, the 
Soviet-Egyptian arms deal of September 1955 was regarded at the time as a great 
turning point in the Middle East, the end of an era, and the beginning of another. As 
for Egypt, the arms deal enabled it to strengthen its position in Arab political circles, 
whilst fostering Nasser’s popularity and image in the Arab world. This allowed Nasser 
"to assume the role of the defiant hero; in contrast to the Iraqi leadership, which had 
bowed to Western demands”. Further against the plans of the Anglo-American policy 
makers, the Council of the Arab League supported Nasser’s stand in buying arms 
through the communist countries. Moreover, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in the 
Arab League told reporters that he saw no reason why all other Arab states should not 
follow Egypt’s example. The Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian Chamber of Deputies 
enacted a resolution of congratulations to Nasser. Even Nuri As-Said, feeling 
constrained to do so, sent a message of congratulation to Nasser. Then, Nasser was 
more encouraged to think that Egypt under his rule and his ruling elite would become 
"the new protagonists of the Arab world, and not Iraq under Nuri As-Said and the old 
politicians”.
Lastly, the Egyptian policy was adjusted by considering Mossadeq’s mistake in 
Iran of trying to improve his relations with the Soviet Union in order to force the US to 
adopt a more cautious policy. Nasser realized that a similar approach would only 
antagonize the US. Despite an account of mutual dislike, eventually, ensuring the 
friendlier-line policy of the US was important to Nasser especially during his rivalry
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with the British sponsored Nuri As-Said. Besides, Nasser had still been aspiring to 
receive US aid to build the Aswan High-Dam which had become the vital aspect of 
Egypt’s ten-year economic plan. '"Egyptian policy makers thus tried to avoid total 
dependence upon the support of one bloc, as this would put an end to their ability to 
maneouvre between the two blocs, and thus achieve their aims more easily”.
(3.3) Extending the ‘Northern Tier’ Doctrine
Meanwhile, the Baghdad Pact had been gaining strength. Pakistan was included 
in the Baghdad Pact on 23 September 1955. Since this meant that on paper the 
southwestern border had been secured by the US, Dulles was gratified. "He had always 
placed reliance in such pieces of paper, representing, as he hoped they would, the 
pledge of the governments subscribing”. Having accomplished the Pakistani 
ahdeherence to the Pact, Britain further pressed the US to join the Baghdad Pact. 
However, the Eisenhower administration’s Middle Eastern policy had been shaped by 
its New Look strategy. Set forth in the October 1953, National Security decision, NSC- 
162/2, the New Look was a major effort to regain the initiative in the global 
confrontation with the Soviet Union whilst reducing the US defense expenditures. The 
fundamental purpose of the New Look was to accomplish this through strengthening the 
pro-Western countries along the entire Soviet sphere of influence while scaling back the 
conventional forces on the ground. Therefore, the Eisenhower administration had begun 
to establish relationships along the Sino-Soviet periphery in order to extend security 
assistance and economic aid to those countries.
Although Iran was to play a key role in the US strategy in view of its location on 
the Northern Tier, the Secretary of State, Dulles, had not included Iran in his Middle 
East trip in 1953, because in his own words, "it is now preoccupied with its oil dispute
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with Britain. But still the people and the Government do not want this quarrel to expose 
them to Communist subversion”. Indeed, for the last two years, President 
Eisenhower had been told that the Shah of Iran believed that Iran could link itself in the 
Free World’s defense. But, no public statement of such an intention could be made 
before the Zahidi government was able to establish itself firmly in power. On 26 July 
1954, Prime Minister Zahidi made the most candid statement of his government about 
Iran’s desire to move closer to the West. In his talk with a group of Iranian editors, he 
stated, “we have witnessed how aggressors have wantonly occupied neutral countries 
in defiance of International law and their own undertaldngs. Therefore, it is certain in 
this turbulent world that a government can preserve itself only if it has the power
of resistance against an aggressorV  54 Thus, the Iranian decision to join the
Baghdad Pact was known before October 1955, but the announcement of its intention 
was being delayed in view of Soviet opposition. Late in the previous month, 
Egypt’s arms deal with Czechoslovakia was announced. This incident, increasing Iran’s 
security anxieties, had a catalystic effect in Iran’s statement of intention to accede to 
the Baghdad Pact.
In October 1955, British Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, obtained the 
approval of the Cabinet on the requests of transfering arms to Iran, to ensure Iran’s 
inclusion in Baghdad Pact. Following the Turkish State visit to Teheran, Iran stated 
its request to join the Baghdad Pact. Although John Foster Dulles had complained to 
the Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, about the cost of re-arming Iran, when 
Iran was at the brink of adherence to the Baghdad Pact, both the US and Britain 
highly favoured this. On 12 October 1955, the State Department declared that 
drawing together of the Northern Tier nations of the Middle East is a normal
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development which should promote peace, stability, and well-being in the area. 
It was stated: “/« no respect can this natural association be deemed hostile 
or threatening or directed against any other nation”. The Foreign Office on 13 
October 1955, stated that it was “a step that would increase security and help the 
cause of peace in the area”. Not surprisingly, the US’ remaining outside the 
pact frustrated the Iranian government. The Iranian administration thought that 
without the formal presence of the US, the Baghdad Pact might fail to provide a 
strong defense against the Soviets. The Iranians also considered that this was likely 
to bring about limitations in military and economic aid. Again, the decline of British 
influence without a substituent American presence, might lead to a favourable situation 
for the Soviets, and the radical regimes of the Middle East.
As expected, the Soviet Union vigorously opposed Iran’s adherence to 
the Baghdad Pact. Soviet opposition was also based on the fear of being circled with 
an Islamic tier. As regards the Soviet reaction, Laqueur stated that: all Islamic
experts were urged to realize the very complex character of the problem” , in Soviets’ 
consideration, ''the aggressive Baghdad Pact exploited the slogan of ‘unity 
of Islam’”. On the other hand, Iraq had cut off diplomatic ties with the Soviet 
Union a few months before, and the Iranian government "being last to join the Pact, 
had obviously anticipated the Soviet reaction”. A Soviet note to Iran on 12 October 
1955 stating, "Iran’s accession to this military alignment is in contradiction with 
Iran’s good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union and the known treaty 
obligations of Iran” was coupled with Pravda reminding the Iranian Government 
that it should not join any “anti-Soviet” pact, according to the treaties of 1921 and 
1927.
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As for the US and Britain, having achieved Iranian adherence to the Baghdad 
Pact, Anglo-American policy makers fostered their efforts to bring additional partners 
into the pact. Whereas, the forthcoming incidents would prove that the pact itself was 
the orbit of escalating tensions.
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IV ANGLO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE BAGHDAD PACT
(4.1) An Unstable Environment Around the Baghdad Pact: 1955-1956
Meanwhile, cleavages over the possesion of the Buraimi oasis between Saudi 
Arabia and the Trucial Sheikhdoms of Abu Dhabi, Muscat and Oman, and the disputes 
over the control of oil reserves, had created some tensions. Indeed, the course of events 
would evoke US’ involvement in the region as well. On 18 October 1955, British 
officer-led troops of the Trucial Sheikhdoms had taken control of the oasis. Shortly 
after, the King of Saudi Arabia expressed his expectation of US assistance against the 
British led occupation. Not surprisingly, Nasser’s regime sided with King Saud. 
Egyptian propaganda especially through the ‘Voice of Arabs’, Cairo’s radio, aimed at 
inflicting harm on Britain’s relations with the Gulf Sheikhdoms. '‘The Saudis, fearful of 
the Hashemites, sided with Egypt as did Yemen. Lebanon stood neutral, whilst Syria 
and Jordan remained undecided but under the pressure of two parties”. '
On 26 October, Macmillan met with Dulles to negotiate reports on Egypt’s 
signing a defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Syria. At the time, Dulles believed that 
Syria was the nearest entity in the Middle East to a Soviet satellite, and he was ready 
for counteraction in Syria. Dulles and Macmillan also agreed that the Baghdad Pact 
should be consolidated through convincing some other countries to join it. Regarding 
his talks with the US Secretary of State, Macmillan stated, “Mr. Dulles asked me 
whether we could not bring pressure upon Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact. He thought 
it would be a fine thing if they did”. ^
Increasing tension in the region, and the bitter charges of colonialism, added to 
the sentiments of anti-Westernism “rang a bell with Americans”.  ^ But, obviously, the 
British opposition to Saudi actions was the main cause of diversity between the US 
and British policies since relations with this country had a particular importance to the 
US. In identifying the reasons of differences of opinion between the UK and US, it can 
be expressed that the former had adopted a hard-line policy in which it had been 
identically regarded as an acting colonialist power, whilst the US worked to acquire an 
opposite identity. This was a grit in the gears of the Anglo-American alliance and other 
signs of fraction were working their way to surface. Around the same issue, in 
November 1955, the Iraqi Premier Nuri As-Said suggested that “the US withold Saudi 
royalties fo r  six months to prevent Saudi funding o f ‘anti-Western’ and ‘anti-Iraqi’ 
forces in Syria and Egypt” Having also considered the request of Iraqi Prime 
Minister, the British Foreign Minister, Macmillan, proposed to take joint steps by the 
US and British governments in order to impose sanctions on the petro-dollar income of 
the Saudi oil companies. But, this met with the response of Dulles expressing the US’ 
difficulties on controlling Saudi revenues.
In November, Macmillan went to Baghdad to attend the first meeting of the 
Baghdad Pact powers. There, desiring to keep the faith in the Pact, he advocated that 
the Egyptian arms deal had been planned long before the Pact. Moreover, he 
insisted that the economic aspect of it was much more important than the military. 
Back in London, he explained “the Pact is not intended to split the Arab World. . . .  I  
believe in the long run it will unite it”.  ^ Indeed, Macmillan was remarkably content 
with the Pact, but, was rather alarmed by communist activities as well. He had also 
decided that Jordanian adherence to the Pact should be realized as soon as possible.
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Concerning Jordan’s security, a proposal by the British Defence Coordinating 
Committee fot the Middle East (BDCC) suggested that Jordan could only be defended 
by British troops. To conduct this, the CORDAGE plan was approved by the British 
Chiefs of Staff. In fact, previously, on 15 February 1955, Jordan had requested British 
support against a possible Israeli attack. The British Chiefs of Staff had not informed 
King Hussein of the CORDAGE plan. A formal reply to the Jordanian request 
expressed that, “. . . . Tripartite Declaration would bring Britain ‘side by side with 
Jordan ’ to resist Israeli aggression, provided Jordan did no take precipitate action 
against Israel".
In addition to the above mentioned Jordanian-Israeli tension, this country was 
under various threats. Obviously, one threat was posed by the traditional enemy of the 
Hashemite Kingdoms; Saudi Arabia. To a certain extent, Jordan was subject to Iraqi 
threat as well, in case of Iraqi monarchy’s attempt to unite the two Hashemite 
monarchies. Until the outbreak of the Second World War, Hashemite dynasty had a 
significant role in the modern history of Arab nationalism. Arabism and its followers 
had gravitated towards Hashemite leadership concentrated in the Fertile Crescent lands. 
The downfall of the Hashemites had actually been followed by, for some time, Iraq’s 
efforts to take further advantages in its relations with Jordan. It is not difficult to assess 
that from time to time, through referring to the existence of tribal-religious 
relationships among themselves, the sons of Sherif Hussein, ruling in Hejaz, Iraq, 
Syria, had pressed young Jordanian King Hussein to submit to their authority.
In the light of a series of developments taking place in the Middle East, clearly, 
Jordan and King Hussein personally occupied a significant place in Anthony Eden’s 
mind in order to consolidate the Baghdad Pact. His interest in Jordanian membership in
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the Pact pushed him to the extent of instructing the Chiefs of Staff to prepare plans for 
military actions against Israel, including seaborne invasion, if Israel attacked Jordan. In 
their turn, the Chiefs of Staff concluded that Jordan’s Arab Legion, commanded by 
John Glubb, popularly known as ‘Glubb Pasha’, a though Scottish General, who had 
been working with Arabs for many years, was not an adequate force to meet serious 
threats.  ^ Regarding this, the British offered tangible military assistance and equipment 
to Jordan to counter clandestine Saudi finance and influence (which were also 
sedulously undermining the position of the Hashemite Monarchy in Iraq) that had 
ambitions for change in the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan. King Hussein was faced 
with the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian defense offer at the same time. Should the Jordanian 
government accept this offer, the contracting parties were to consider any armed attack 
on the territory or on the forces of Jordan as an attack on themselves. But, king Hussein 
had no intention of accepting these proposals.
As regards Syria’s position, having noticed the Syrian government’s 
collaboration with Egypt to harm British interests and weaken the authority of the 
British protected Jordanian king, Britain decided to back Iraqi efforts to gain influence 
over Syria. This was favoured by the Foreign Office, because it was considered that 
such an action would decrease the threat from Egypt as well. In addition to this, 
an enlargement in Iraqi-Jordanian axis, perhaps, to include Syria in the future, was 
targeted.
Meanwhile, King Hussein was now coming under intense pressure in Amman 
from hostile factions loudly encouraged by the “Voice of Arabs” and financed by both 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. As the situation was so serious and the Arab Legion forces 
were so scattered, Britain took some more measures to hold its troops ready in Cyprus
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to go to king Hussein’s assistance in case of emergency. Saudi Arabia was also warned 
that in the event of a Saudi attack on Jordan, Britain would fulfil its undertakings of the 
1948 Treaty to go to the Jordan’s help. Although this worked and the Saudis quickly 
drew their troops back from the Jordanian border, they drastically increased their 
subversive activities in Jordan. Nasser was also told that he should stop his policy of 
inciting the people of Jordan to civil war and his attacks on king Hussein. Nasser 
assured the British Ambassador in Cairo, Humphrey Trevelyan, that broadcasting 
against Jordan and Britain would be stopped. However, there was no lessening of the 
events, but even more attacks on Iraq, and an increasing virulence against Hussein and 
Glubb.
Consecutively, king Hussein told British Ambassador in Amman, Charles Duke,
on 9 November that, Jordan was ready to join the Baghdad Pact "‘given the necessary
backing”. * On the other hand, there was no agreement in the House of Commons as
regards the arms deliveries to the Middle East. Obviously, the Jordanian arms requests
were cautiously handled because of the Arab-Israeli tension at hand. There were even
questions directed to the government as to why it could not talk over the issue with the
Soviets. On 12 November, in his speech in the House of Commons, replying to a
question, Eden stated his views on the arms transfers to the Middle East:
This is one o f the most difficult topics to handle from the point of 
view of the Government. . . . At the present time, o f course, the House 
is apt to look at this matter as though the arms deliveries were only 
coming from ourselves, France and the United States who are 
signatories to the Tripartite Agreement and perhaps from Russia as 
well.
That is not true. They are coming from all parts of the world to Israel 
and to the Arab States on a very large scale. We have done what we 
could ourselves during this period, and when it was my reponsibility 
at the Foreign Office we spent a great many hours trying as far as we 
could to see that the balance of deliveries was kept fairly as we could 
contrive, not only by ourselves, but together with the United States 
and France, our principal Allies.
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Now, o f course, a new element has been injected into this situation.
The right hon. Gentleman asked, ‘Why cannot you talk over this new 
situation with the Russians?’. . . .  We have made a number of 
approaches to try to see whether anything of this kind was possible, 
but /  am bound to say, to put it mildly, that the replies have not been 
encouraging. . . .  We asked, as we hoped, for a hopeful answer, but 
we did not get it. ®
Facing strong domestic opposition, Eden sought ways to receive a definite US
commitment to the Baghdad Pact. The expectations of the British government from the
US in ensuring this backing to Jordan was also explicit in the memorandum, dated 9
December 1955, from the Director of the office of Near Eastern Affairs to the Assistant
Secretary of State, George Allen. Here, it was explained:
. . . .  we asked Ambassador Mallory to keep us informed and also to 
comment on the British view that United States support for the U.K. in 
its efforts to get Jordanian adherence would be of particular 
significance. The British have said that a U.S. promise of additional 
economic aid to Jordan would be very helpful.
Ambassador Mallory has replied. . . . giving his view that a mere 
verbal assurance of U.S. support for Jordan’s adherence or even an 
undertaking to provide additional economic aid would have limited 
effect on the Jordanians. He feels that the strongest effect could be 
gained through commitments to furnish military aid.
But, the demonstrations held in December in Amman increased bitterness, 
challenging the pro-Western government and the Baghdad Pact. The message from the 
British Commander in Chief of the Arab Legion in Jordan, General John Glubb, also 
warned that increasing Egyptian pressure, supported by the Saudi finances was an 
irritant. One ambition of the Egyptians he said was “to dominate the Middle East and to 
this purpose it is essential for them to get rid of British and American influence” “ , 
and, as it was mentioned before, the Saudis had already taken a stand against the British 
in Buraimi oasis dispute. In response to this, the Jordanian Kingdom repeated its need 
for a greater army which would be financed by Britain. Subsequently, at Macmillan’s 
suggestion, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Gerald Templer, was sent
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to Amman to make a proposal on behalf of the UK. General Templer said that if Jordan 
would not cooperate with its real friends, then Jordan would be risking its very regime 
and its very existence as an independent state. He further emphasized that the Jordanian 
decision to take sides with Britain would be followed by an offer of military supplies 
and the establishment of the Jordanian air force by sending Jordan ten Vampire fighters.
At the same time, Jordanian accession would be supported by doubling the British 
aid of £10 million. But, as it will be discussed below, Templer’s mission was a failure. 
Behind the unexpected rejection of the Jordanian government of the British proposals, 
there were primarily the propagandists of Nasser and the popular case of the Palestinian 
refugees. Given this situation, in the context of rising pro-Nasserist sentiment, the 
overwhelming majority of king Hussein’s ministers rejected signing a letter of intent to 
collaborate with Britain.
As regards Turkey, the Turkish government favoured the inclusion of Jordan 
and Lebanon in the Baghdad Pact since this would create a positive example to all the 
countries of the Middle East, and consolidate opposition against the Soviet menace. 
Turkey was among the principal countries which was under Soviet threat. As it was 
mentioned previously, this was made explicit by the increasing Soviet territorial 
demands following the end of the Second World War. Turkey had enthusiastically 
desired NATO membership and had achieved this following its involvement in the 
Korean War which lasted nearly three years.
Having made a great contribution to Iran’s inclusion in the Baghdad Pact, the 
second destination of Turkish delegation was Amman. When they came back from their 
visit to Amman, the Turkish President Celal Bayar, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Fatin Rüştü Zorlu (who replaced Fuat Köprülü on 29 July 1955 and served in this post
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until 9 December 1955), had the impression that they had brought Hussein to the verge 
of membership. However, anti-Westernism was winning over Jordan. In the week 
General Templer visited Amman, between 7th and 14th December, four ministers of 
Palestinian origin from the West Bank resigned in protest. This led to a change in the 
Cabinet. Hazza Majali headed the new government. But, since he was pro-Pact, 
opposition continued unabated. Increasing pressure upon Majali, aimed to obtain a 
statement from him against the Baghdad Pact.
Despite the gathering storms in the Middle East, Anthony Eden’s visit to 
Washington late in January 1956, did not resolve a serious difference of opinion 
between the Americans and British. Interestingly, Sherman Adams stated that, “o«rfirm 
opposition to colonialism made us sympathetic to the struggle which Egypt and the other 
Arab states were making to free themselves from the political and economic control that 
the British felt they had to maintain in the Middle East in their own self-interest”. In 
a sense, Britain was left a maverick in pursuance of its policy in the Middle East.
It was on 1 March 1956, the Jordanian Prime Minister Samir Rifai, with the 
direction of king Hussein, who was under increasing pressure, asked General Glubb to 
leave the country in two hours. When king Hussein dismissed his long time British 
adviser, and commander of the Arab Legion, Eden was infuriated. Anthony Nutting, 
who was then the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, recalled how Eden 
shouted in anger: '‘What’s all this nonsense about isolating Nasser or neutralizing him, 
as you call it? I want him destroyed, can’t you understand?”. When Nutting urged 
that Eden, before overthrowing Nasser, should have thought of an alternative, a more 
amenable man to succeed him, so as to avoid turmoil in Egypt, Eden decidedly replied:
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“Bwi I  don’t want an alternative, and I don’t give a damn if there’s anarchy and chaos 
in Egypt”.
Against this background, the new British Foreign Minister (after Eden’s 
reshuffle of the Cabinet at the end of December 1955), Selwyn Lloyd arrived in Cairo 
on the day of Glubb’s dismissal. Lloyd was determined to make progress in his talks 
with Nasser, who was causing his government various difficulties with his opposition to 
the Baghdad Pact and his espousal of Arab Nationalism. At the peak of tension, Nasser 
proposed to Lloyd that he would stop the anti-British and anti-Pact propoganda, if 
Britain would ‘freeze’ its active role in the Baghdad Pact. Besides, as Lloyd learned 
that the dismissal of Glubb was conducted upon Nasser’s inducement, he stated the 
adverse effect of this on bilateral relations. In the end, Lloyd did not get along any 
better with Nasser than had Eden the year before. Actually, nothing in the past year had 
contributed more to the growing friction between their countries than Britain’s reckless 
determination to enlist Arab nations in the Pact, and Egypt’s unyielding opposition”. ’’ 
Lloyd tried to assure Nasser that the British had no interest in old-fashioned domination 
and the Baghdad Pact looked north, not south. It was to prevent Soviet infiltration 
and to protect the oil. However, Lloyd failed to assure Nasser of Britain’s benign 
intentions.
Anglo-Egyptian relations worsened within this context. This was also due to 
Eden’s growing anti-Nasser policy which had increased to the extent of comparing 
Nasser with Mussolini and Hitler. On 10 March 1956, Britain realized the necessity 
of updating its policies towards Jordan, when Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria repeated 
their proposals to replace British assistance to Jordan. This led to considerations of 
bringing Iraq and Jordan closer in bilateral treaties, subsequently to encompass the
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conclusion of trilateral treaties including Britain. However, further events were yet to 
come and prove that all the efforts were futile to halt the escalating tension. Reports 
continued to flood London and Washington about the deteriorating stability. The region 
was on the verge of a major crisis.
(4.2) From “An Unstable Environment” to A Major Crisis in Snez
Against the background of prevailing differences of opinion with Britain, a 
decision to support the Baghdad Pact, and the policies specifically directed to Egypt and 
other countries were expressed by Dulles to Eisenhower on 28 March 1956. The US 
administration, in conformity with British foreign policy officials, decided to damage 
Nasser’s prestige and provide support to the moderate Arab elements. The first pressure 
was put on Egypt’s Aswan Dam project. The projected High Dam on Aswan was a 
gigantic undertaking in the land of the Nile. It was the most cherished project of Gamal 
Abd-el Nasser and his Revolutionary Council of army officers. The first Aswan Dam 
was completed in 1902 and heightened in 1912 and 1933. But, Egypt had been faced 
with a rapid population growth, which was greater than the amount of cultivable land 
added by the dam enlargements. Only the fertile delta and the narrow strip of land near 
Nile were under irrigation, equal to a mere three percent of Egypt’s land, beyond lay 
the Sahara. The state was racing with the discrepancies between population growth and 
hunger, thus, the water of the Nile had to be captured and adequately distributed to 
begin to catch up its agricultural wealth of a century earlier. Regarding these, it was 
considered by Washington that the time for ignoring Egyptian need for a High Dam on 
Aswan had passed and the entry of Russia into the Middle East was the act that finally 
pushed Washington into backing the Aswan Dam. However, Israel’s increasing 
influence and the growing Soviet activities in Egypt, which was spreading to some
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other regional countries changed the policy of the State Department that they had to act 
together with UK to warn Nasser. The UK and US, by demonstrating that they could 
withdraw their financial and technical contribution from the project aimed to show their 
determination to resist communist infiltration and their intolerance towards the regimes 
receiving aid from the Soviets. Initially, Egypt’s talks with the World Bank was broken. 
However, the success of the Anglo-American strategy was jeopardized by the Soviet 
threat to finance the Aswan Dam. The Anglo-American policy makers regarded the 
Soviet attempt as a serious communist penetration into the Middle East, and shifted to a 
hard-line policy, especially the British. However, on an account of historical facts, 
Macdonald argued that, the withdrawal of the American aid ''not only led to the Suez 
Crisis and the punitive expeditions staged by Israel, France and Britain, but also 
opened the door for the unrestrained development of Soviet bloc influence in the area 
and thereby destroyed the utility of the Baghdad Pact”. Indeed, falsifying the 
Western powers’ anxiety, Nasser had rejected US $ 400 million by the Soviets for fear 
of being dragged into a long-term dependence on Moscow.
In the meantime, a threat to the Western position in Syria emerged when the 
government of Said Ghazzi resigned on 2 June because of increased student 
demonstrations, opposing Syria’s economic interaction with France and to protest 
French policy in Algeria. Sabri Asali, who was Prime Minister between 1954-55, 
formed a Cabinet which included two ministers of Ba’ath. Salah Bitar became minister 
of Foreign Affairs. Asali and Ba’ath leader, Akram Hourani were close to each 
other and they agreed on the proclamation of an Egyptian-Syrian Union, open to all 
Arabs who have no defense treaties with foreign powers. In addition, left-wing 
Army officers were insistent on such a statement. Britain opposed prevalence
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of Ba’athist policies which were against Western influence. Therefore, Anglo-American 
officials unanimously aimed to build opposition to this. Discussions around the 
operation STRAGGLE, were designed to intervene in the elections or to sponsor a coup 
in Syria. The Anti-Leftist Arab Liberation Party, formed by a group of officers, was 
led by an important figure, Michel Ilyan, who was assisted to overcome Leftists. Ilyan 
tried to control Aleppo and Damascus. He was also supported by the media from Egypt, 
and by the Saudis, who were enjoying the flow of petro-dollar finance. Muslim 
Brotherhood and the tribes on the Iraqi-Syrian border were on Ilyan’s side. In addition, 
when Iraqi pressure increased, the former President, Hashim Atassi came back from 
Rome to establish a right-wing coalition.
As for Jordan, On 26 June 1956, king Hussein dissolved the Chamber of 
Deputies because of the lack of cooperation between the Chamber and the Executive 
after he had decided to replace the Anglo-Jordanian treaty by an agreement with Egypt 
and Syria. Elections were being prepared and the Hashemites of Jordan and Iraq on the 
one side, and the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian Alliance on the other, were competing 
to influence the outcome. Concerning the changes in the Jordanian government, and this 
country’s falling apart, Eisenhower noted in his diary, “We tried to make the British see 
the danger of pressuring Jordan to join the Northern Tier Pact. They went blindly ahead 
and only recently have been suffering one of the most severe diplomatic defeats Britain 
has taken in many years”. In the meantime, Israel was also getting anxious regarding 
a change in the military and political status quo in Jordan which might endanger its 
security. In the event of the arrival in Jordan of troops from Iraq or from other Arab 
countries, Israel also declared that it would reserve the right to intervene. Further
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problems against the Western positions were to emerge, which would soon turn to the 
region into a fire ball.
Turning back to the cleavages around the financing of the Aswan Dam, it can be 
stated that, in part, the withdrawal of financial aid by the US was a result of the 
decision of the Senate Appropriations Committee for the fiscal year of 1957. However, 
this action led Nasser to re-consider his policies, including the potential nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal Company. In reality, the reasons which temporarily stopped Nasser 
from going ahead with the nationalisation project were the poor foreign exchange 
reserves of Egypt, not knowing how to compensate Suez Canal share holders, and the 
lack of technical ability to construct the Aswan Dam. Under these circumstances, 
Nasser shifted to treat the US withdrawal of aid as a personal affront and emphasized 
Egypt’s determination of recovering its needs.
On 26 July, seven days after the American announcement of the withdrawal of
financial support for the construction of the Aswan Dam, Nasser, who meanwhile
returned from his visit to Yugoslavia, proclaimed in a mass meeting at Alexandria that,
“We shall eliminate the past by regaining our right to the Suez Canal”. On the same
day the Egyptian government declared:
The Suez Canal Maritime Company, S.A.E., is nationalized. All 
money, rights and obligations of the company are transfered to the 
State. All organisaions and committees now operating the company 
are dissolved.
In the same speech by Nasser, it was also stated that imperialism annihilated 
Palestine and supported Israel so that they could attempt to convert the Arabs into a 
state of refugees. In explaining international support for his decision, Nasser 
emphasized that the statements of the Brioni conference in Yugoslavia endorsed the 
principles of Bandung, and added that, the resolution issued in Brioni by the heads of
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states of Yugoslavia, India and Egypt stated that the cooperation among them 
contributed to develop relations among nations on the basis of equality. He also 
expressed that all nations should have the right to choose freely their political and 
economic systems, and their mode of life in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the UN Charter.
Nasser’s statements met with severe British and French reactions. In the House 
of Commons, Eden declared that Nasser’s action was in breach of the Concession 
Agreements and he referred to it as an arbitrary action which would affect both 
the operation of the Canal and wider questions. He also stated that the British 
government were consulting other governments immediately concerned with regard to 
the serious situation created. On 30 July, Eden declared that, “no arrangements for the 
future of this great waterway could be acceptable to Her Majesty’s Government which 
would leave it in the unfettered control of a single Power which could, as recent events 
have shown, exploit it purely for purposes of national policy". By that time, the 
Egyptian sterling balances had been frozen. On 2 August, Eden informed the House of 
Commons that certain precautionary measures of a military nature were being taken. 
Here, Eden emphasized his view of the outstanding necessity to implement different 
measures other than economic sanctions.
In France, the reaction was more vigorous. The French Foreign Minister, 
Christian Pineau, handed the Egyptian Ambassador such a strongly worded note that 
there was talk of a break of diplomatic relations. The reaction of the US was less 
severe. The official response stated that, the matter was one of concern mainly to the 
principal users of Canal. On 28 July, the Acting Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, 
protested to the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington, only about the intemperate.
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inaccurate and misleading statements which President Nasser made at Alexandria on 26 
July. In general terms, the US firmly disassociated itself from the challenge which was 
directed to the Egyptian government.
In his turn, Eden continued to press for implementing heavy sanctions on Egypt. 
Following Dulles’ visit to London, at a meeting between Dulles, Lloyd and Pineau, 
Eden stated that Nasser’s action was a breach of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 
on transit passage through the Canal. Dulles consented to the tripartite members making 
a strong condemnation of Egypt’s action and affirmation of the need to place the Canal 
under international control. As a result, a tripartite Anglo-French-US statement was 
made on 2 August. It was proposed to hold a conference of the signatories of the 1888 
Convention and its beneficiaries to consider the establishment of an operating 
arrangement for the Canal under an international system.
Contrary to the British anxiety for direct action to keep Nasser in line and 
protecting the Suez Canal and Western Europe’s supply of oil , the US indicated its 
reluctance to the use of force, “/f was the reverse of the Indo-China situation, where 
Dulles had been unable to persuade the British to join the United States in direct 
military action to keep the Communists out of Vietnam. Now the shoe was on the other 
foot and it did not fit  well”. ”  "" Dulles, the brinksman whom Europeans for years had 
criticized as being bellicose, was now preaching peace and patience; Eden the 
compromiser wanted war”. In the meantime, in order to attain a quick resolve, the 
Egypt Committee in the Foreign Office , planned for military involvement even without 
waiting for Eden’s order.
As regards Israel, since it was trying to enhance its security in the region, the 
Israeli government decided to join the Western alliance, which was designed to remove
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Nasser. First, Ben Gurion removed a major obstacle in collaborating with France, by 
pressing the Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, who advocated cooperation with the US. 
Sharett was against the British, French and Israeli involvement in Suez. Thus, he had 
sided with the US which was against military option. Director General of the Israeli 
Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres, Chief of the General Staff, General Moshe Dayan, 
and the Chief of Army intelligence. General Yehoshafat Harkabi met with French 
officials of the corresponding services to coordinate the proposed operation. The details 
of the assault plan were concluded through inter-governmental talks. The primary goal 
was the overthrow of Nasser. The approved route was from Alexandria to the Canal 
and Cairo. The operation was codenamed; MUSKETEER.
In reality, planning for the invasion had started on 28 July. France sent 
its highest ranking military officials to London on that date to meet with their 
counterparts, and during the weekend a secret Joint military command was formed. 
Meanwhile, Dulles decided to leave for London. On Wednesday, the day Dulles arrived 
in London, the War Office reported that ""precautionary military measures were 
being taken”.
The US, which remained outside the operation, was also seeking other schemes 
to prevent an Anglo-Egyptian confrontation. Indeed, Washington was trying to develop 
alternative policies to preserve stability in the region. Previously, Robert Anderson, 
whose mediatory mission took place in the early months of 1956, had suggested to 
Dulles on 4 April that NATO work out a military plan to protect Western assets in the 
Middle East. But, Dulles had rejected Anderson’s plan. The Eisenhower administration 
had been loosely associating itself with thé Northern Tier Pact and aiming to build up 
confidence in its policies. Thus, facing the crisis over Suez, the US again tried to avoid
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conflict in the region at any expense. Eisenhower stated that the use of force might be 
necessary only under extreme circumstances. Meanwhile, Nasser made his view 
explicit to Washington, London and Paris against the proposal to internationalize the 
Suez Canal. In this context, Eden’s determination to suppress or overthrow Nasser was 
publicized during his speech, broadcasted on radio and television on 8 August.
On 12 August, the Egyptian government issued a statement in which it declined 
to attend the London Conference. In London, a Suez committee, chaired by the 
Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, was appointed by the eighteen powers 
among the participant countries. Not surprisingly, Shepilov, on behalf of the Soviet 
Union criticized the American proposals and stated that the only legitimate owner of the 
Canal was the Egyptian state. Despite the Soviet efforts, the idea promoted by the US to 
bring Nasser to the negotiation table found a stronger basis with the initiation of the 
tripartite proposal for the international control of the Canal. However, Nasser expressed 
that Egypt would be the decision-maker to allow the Canal’s international use, and that 
he would not consent to the idea of a multilateral agreement. Besides, Nasser blamed 
the proposal as a ''restoration of collective colonialism”. In the end, the talks 
between Menzies and Nasser were fruitless. Thus, the conference approach failed.
There are some grounds for believing that the independent action which Britain
undertook in the Suez dispute, was intended to be an assertion of Britain’s independence
in its policy from the US in the region. The issue had been turned into something that
would show Washington what London could do. Anthony Nutting noted that:
Nobody was kept more completely in the dark than the President o f the 
United States. After Eden’s initial confession that he wanted war had 
provoked Eisenhower to indignant protests, the President was treated 
as unreliable ally. The more he warned Eden that American and world 
opinion would not support him if he appeared to be trying to browbeat 
a smaller nation into submission, the more determined Eden became 
to conceal his hand from the Americans.
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It was a matter of raising Britain’s status in the Middle East as well. On the 
other hand, any succesful prospect of the operation launched by London and Paris could 
hardly please the US, “'since it would have meant a radical strengthening of British 
positions in the Middle East”. Again, the US government had no wish to quarrel 
with the Arabs, therefore, the British could hardly get American support in their war 
against Nasser. Bearing this in his mind, Eden merely informed Eisenhower of 
decisions after they were taken, and in very general terms. These contributed to an 
emerging US interest which was impicitly defined in the failure of Eden’s initiative.
Dulles, among his conference making policies, introduced the Suez Canal Users 
Plan, which basically proposed to pay off Nasser while running the Canal with pilots 
employed by the US. However, Britain was revising the plans of invasion. General 
Keightly, who was the Commander in Chief of MUSKETEER, brought out the 
MUSKETEER REVISE, which concentrated upon the moral devastation of Egypt by 
aerial and naval bombing. Additionally, Operation REVISE was approved and 
complimentary operations PICK UP and CONVOY were proceeded to hinder Egyptian 
supervision of Canal Transit. Besides, directly targeting the overthrow of Nasser, MI6 
operated in Egypt with the opponents of the Nasser regime. Egypt Committee was the 
center where intelligence gathered by MI6 was analysed.
In Eden’s and Lloyd’s talks with the French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, and 
the Foreign Minister, Pineau, the British committment to Jordan under CORDAGE re­
surfaced. The tension at the Israeli-Jordanian border was compounded by the shaky 
political situation in Jordan and king Hussein’s authority was continuously challenged 
by the clandestine activities backed by Nasser. Moreover, the Soviet Union was aiming 
to topple Hussein in order to bring the kingdom under Nasser’s influence. The British
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had also planned Jordan to receive Iraqi troops in case of an urgency. Meanwhile, 
Israel’s rejection to countenance the deployment of the Iraqi military units further 
strained the Israeli-British relations. Having considered the significance of Jordan, Eden 
said, ""if Israel attacked Jordan, we are bound to go to Jordan’s help”. Certainly, 
legal grounds existed for this. In the event that Israel took military action, Britain 
would be obliged to come to Jordan’s help under both the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 
1948 and the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. Thus, a supplementary policy was 
designed in case of an outbreak of an Arab-Israeli war. Looking at the political 
atmosphere in the region, obviously, the hopes invested on the infant Baghdad Pact 
were shadowed with these war plans.
The second (mid September 1956) and the third (1-5 October) international 
conferences met in London could not overcome the existing impasse. As for the super 
powers, the Soviets, occupied with the revolution in Hungary, and the US engaged in 
Presidential elections, had moved their focus away from the Middle East. In 
appearence, the timing for the military intervention in Suez was appropriate. During the 
last week of October, intelligence reports received by the US indicated that Israel was 
mobilizing its forces and on 31 October, Israeli troops invaded the Sinai Peninsula and 
advanced rapidly both in the direction of the Straits of Tiran and Canal. On 30 October, 
the US sponsored a resolution which called upon the withdrawal of Israel behind the 
armistice lines. However, the Anglo-French vetoes started to paralyse the UN. Anglo- 
French Naval action begun on the evening of 31 October. On 1 November, air-raids 
were launched, on 5-6 November, paratroopers were dropped and bombardment and 
invasion continued. By 7 November, following US attempts, cease-fire was declared.
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Referring to the Anglo-French invasion, President Eisenhower said in a 
broadcast that, “Z/ie United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of 
these actions. Nor were we informed of them in advance. . . .  We believe these actions 
have been taken in error”. ^  Indeed, the US administration evaluated the armed 
intervention of Britain and France as actions which could lead to actual involvement of 
the Soviet Union into the region through Egypt and the Suez affair. The Anglo-French 
decision to resort to the use of force, thus, was rejected in favour of the promulgation 
of the Eisenhower Doctrine, a presidential commitment to assist any state in the Middle 
East threatened by the communism.
Nasser’s action was criticized in the West for not having concentrated on 
internal affairs and precipitating “adventurist actions”. In the war, Egypt had suffered 
an estimated 3.000 dead, and had lost large amounts of equipment. But, with start for 
the evacuation of the Suez Canal, ports and other invaded areas, the outcome of the 
Suez affair turned to be a political and to a certain extent economic victory for Nasser. 
It remarkably consolidated his position inside Egypt and encouraged him to pursue the 
Arab revolution more enthusiastically against the Imperial powers. Besides, “tY ended 
the period o f British paramountcy in the central area of the Arab Middle East and 
brought the United States and Russia face to face in that region where the Arabs 
themselves sought to fill the vacuum’ between them”.
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V CONCLUSION
The progress of events in the Suez conflict in 1956 are outside the focus of 
discussion here. However, as Devereux stated: “they happened against a background of 
the substantial rethinking and reorganization taking place in the British defence 
establishment during late 1955 and early 1956”. *
With the Middle Eastern countries possession of much of the world’s oil 
reserves and with the shortest sea and air routes to Asia and East Africa, the danger to 
the West of leaving a power vacuum in the area for the Soviet Union to fill was 
explicit. On the other hand, the years 1950 to 1954, were those of political confusion 
and proved to be difficult ones for US-British relations in the Middle East. France had 
already been expelled from the Middle East, and now Britain’s withdrawal from its 
Empire was taking place.  ^ Facing the decline of British influence in the Middle East, 
the US got more actively involved in the region. By the time that the Eisenhower 
administration took office in January 1953, American foreign policy makers had made a 
judgement that the US might soon have to take over the British position in the Middle 
East. Actually, Britain seemed to accept a larger US role in the area. The forthcoming 
Northern Tier Project initially offered a collaborative policy which would be promoted 
under the title of the Baghdad Pact by the UK.
For Britain, the Suez Canal area had long been the vital centre of the British 
defense system in the Middle East. But, no formula could be found for the conciliation 
of Britain’s strategic interests with Egyptian nationalism and Nasser’s will for an 
uncontested leadership position in the Arab World. In this context, Britain agreed to
gradually evacuate the Canal Zone, but, it absolutely failed to secure Egypt as the hinge 
upon which a new defense organisation might turn. Subsequently, the Pact between 
Turkey and Iraq which was signed in Baghdad on 26 February 1955 was adopted as a 
substitute. However, Egypt accused Iraq of bowing to the will of Western 
imperialism. Nasser’s attitude certainly evoked a considerable popular reaction 
throughout the Middle East. Ultimately, none of the Arab states joined Iraq in the 
Baghdad Pact. Moreover, with the Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defense Pact on 20 October 
1955 and with a similar pact between Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed on 27 October 
1955, Egypt managed to draw Syria and Saudi Arabia into what amounted to a counter 
alliance directed at the Baghdad Pact. The adherence to this arrangement of Saudi 
Arabia, which had significant ties with the United States, was another of the handicaps 
which hindered a common Anglo-American approach to the growing problems in 
the Middle East.
At the beginning of 1956, British policy makers’ projects reached a phase in 
which the attitude of Jordan was concerned. Britain had bases in Jordan and the country 
was in receipt of British military and financial support. Jordan’s Arab Legion was 
commanded by General Glubb and the defense of the country almost entirely depended 
on this force. But, Nasser’s anti-pact policies had also effect on the Jordanian 
government which had problems to control the public sentiment and the reactions of the 
Palestinians that constituted half of its population. As a result, Jordan did not join the 
Baghdad Pact. The British government had sent General Templer to Amman in order to 
draw Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. But, riots broke out, and the government resigned. 
Consequently, chaotic developments and the changes of government took place. Early 
on the morning of 2 March, the dismissal of General Glubb was announced by Jordan
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radio. The dismissal of General Glubb was a heavy blow to Britain’s position. And, as 
expected, Jordan did not show inclination any longer to join the Baghdad Pact.
The formation of the Baghdad Pact coincided with rapid international changes
comprising the other states in the Middle East. The continued opposition of Egypt and
finally the Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956, moved
the focus away from the Baghdad Pact. Shortly afterwards, war over Suez broke out.
The war in Suez had the worse effect on Anglo-American relations. In Britain, anti-
American feelings as Ambassador Winthrop W. Aldrich warned Washington, were at a
post-war high.  ^ On 17 January 1957, on a television broadcast, Macmillan, having
succeeded Eden following his leave of Prime Ministership due to ill-health on 9
January, said of restoring amity with the United States:
The life o f the free world depends upon the partnership between us.
Any partners are bound to have their differences now and then. I ’ve 
always found it so. . .  . But true partnership is based on respect. We 
don’t intend to part from the Americans, and we don’t intend to be 
satellites.
Another factor which handicapped the development of the “infant” Baghdad Pact 
into a reliable military asset, was the US decision to not to join it. In the begining, 
within the framework of establishing a Northern Tier, the Eisenhower administration 
had pressed the Pakistani government to make a pact with Turkey. Besides, the US, in 
conjunction with Britain, had launched the ALPHA project to settle the Arab-Israeli 
dispute through secret negotiations. Following the events which took place during the 
course of 1955, especially the Egyptian arms deal with the Soviets in his mind, Dulles 
appeared to be unconcerned about the Baghdad Pact. He thought, “If they had not 
moved to join and promote the Baghdad Pact, then Nasser might not have turn hostile 
and taken Soviet arms”.  ^ Ultimately, contrary to the expectation of the British and in
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spite of the part it played in bringing the Pact about, the United States remained 
outside. This was a veiled aspect of the divergence between British and American 
policies in the Middle East.
In all circumstances, stability may result from strategic and political engineering 
by the unanimous actions of the major powers within the working of a balance of 
power. But, the fundamental problem faced by the Baghdad Pact was the lack of this 
unanimity in the actions of mainly the US and Britain. On 21 November 1956, 
Eisenhower told a meeting of advisors “t/ the British get us into the Baghdad Pact-as 
the matter would appear to the Arabs-we would lose our influence with the Arabs”.  ^
Consequently, as Ashton stated, the Baghdad Pact was rejected in favour of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine; a presidential commitment to assist any state in the Middle East, 
threatened by communist menace. Regarding Britain, Devereux stated that: “By 1956, 
Britain was rethinking her global defense position, and the Baghdad Pact was in effect 
eliminated as a defense priority”. ’
The US decision to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact, announced 
at the Bermuda Conference of March 1957, as Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd stated 
to Harold Caccia, the British Ambassador in Washington, was “very much second the 
best and no substitute for full accession to the pact”. *
When the Suez Crisis ended, another threat to Western positions emerged, 
precipitated by the Soviet infiltration to Syria. Moreover, in Lebanon, there were 
signs of confrontation between Muslim and Christian communities, and between pro- 
Western and pan-Arab fractions which were to prove lethal in the years to come.
On the 14th of July 1958, Macmillan was informed by Sewlyn Lloyd of the 
tragic news that there had been a violent military coup by dissident army units in
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Baghdad. The twenty-three-year-old king Feisal (who was only recently educated in 
Britain together with his cousin, king Hussein of Jordan), had been murdered. Nuri As- 
Said escaped, but was caught the day after, and was also killed. ''Iraq had left the ranks 
of the Western Alliance. The Baghdad Pact was no more”. ^
Nuri As-Said and the old nationalists around him had believed that Arab 
aspirations could and should be achieved and reconciled with the Western powers. 
Whereas, the young nationalists led by Egypt had put forward that the Arab lands were 
divided up after the first World War to give the West, specifically to Britain, the 
instruments of “divide and rule”. As-Said and his government had only one chance. It 
was that the West should extend them military and political backing. As-Said had 
needed strong political support because his friendship with Britain and the West had laid 
his regime wide open to attacks. This help never came. At a National Security Council 
Meeting on 24 July 1958, Dulles argued that, "the Iraqi Government fell because Iraq 
was in an unnatural association with Turkey and the United Kingdom in the Baghdad 
Pact”. On the other hand, one can say that, the long-standing misgivings of the US 
government about the Baghdad Pact worked to the disadvantage of this defense 
formation, and as regards the coup in Iraq, the US attitude did not resist the military 
conspirators in their action to tear Iraq apart from the Western camp. Another 
consequence of the Middle East Crisis in 1958, had been "to create an apparent threat 
to Turkey by allowing Russia to establish herself on Turkey’s southern flank”. "
Looking back over the events of these years, it can be concluded that the 
Baghdad Pact which became subjected to various challenges, with the shift of the 
policies mainly pursued by the UK and US, was left out of strategic planning by the late 
1950s. However, a quest for Northern Tier defense remained but, could hardly be
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achieved. The Baghdad Pact, renamed the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) after 
Iraq’s defection, was not attempted to bring into life again. In closing, given a variety 
of reasons to explain this case, many of the results of the Anglo-American policies 
around the Northern Tier project, were far from the predicted but were at least 
dramatic.
82
Notes
Notes to Ch. I
1. Nigel John Ashton, “The Hijacking of A Pact: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact 
and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East 1955-58,” in Review of International 
Studies , 19, 1993, 123.
2. Muhammed Abd el-Wahab Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 
1952-1956 (Surrey: Laam Ltd., 1989), 26.
3. Elie Kedourie, “Quest for Stability,” in Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East 
ed. by J. C. Hurewitz (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), 194.
4. This definition is derivated from. Foreign Relations of the United States [hereinafter 
referred to as FRUS] Volume V, The Near East, Memorandum by the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State, 27 
December 1950 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1951), 4.
5. Anthony Eden, Memoirs: Full Circle (London: Cassel&Co. Ltd., 1960), 331.
6. Roy Fullick and Geoffrey Powel, Suez: The Double War , (London: Hamish 
Hamilton Ltd., 1979), 1.
Notes to ch. II
1. Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt. 1945-1956 (North 
Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 30.
2. The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 formally recognized Egyptian sovereignty and 
ended British occupation of Egypt and granted Britain the right to deploy ten thousand 
soldiers, four hundred pilots, and an unspecified number of personnel in the Suez Canal 
and in Sinai, and personnel to run naval bases in Alexandria. Both Cairo and London 
had gains from the 1936 treaty. In this treaty, Egypt had agreed to provide Britain with 
supplies and facilities and when war flared in Europe in 1939, Britain invoked the 
Anglo-Egyptian treaty and Fifty-five thousand British troops arrived in Egypt. British 
forces repelled the attacks of the Italians and Germans in the autumn of 1940 and in late 
1941. However, despite the proximity of fighting, Egyptian authorities did not leave 
their neutrality. Egyptian neutrality was disliked by the British and prompted a 
confrontation between Cairo and London when General Erwin Rommel repeated the 
German offensive in 1942 and captured El Alamein, just sixty miles from Alexandria. 
King Farouk, anxious about the German occupation, appointed Ali Maher as Prime 
Minister who was known with his sympathy towards the Germans. The British 
Ambassador in Cairo, Miles Lampson, insisted that Nahas should be appointed in
83
replacement of All Maher. But, Farouk resisted and on 4 February 1942, Lampson, and 
General R. G. W. H. Stone, surrounded Abdin Palace with troops and tanks. Then, 
Lampson and Stone with a group of guards marched into Palace, and repeated their 
demands in Farouk’s private study room. Farouk was pressed to appoint Nahas or 
abdicate. Farouk appointed Nahas, and Nahas stopped the activities of Axis 
sympathizers. Following the parliamentary elections in which the Wafd won 231 of 264 
seats, Egypt was kept on the Allies’ side as a friendly neutral. In November 1942, 
General Bernard Montgomery defeated Rommel at El Alamein and drove the German 
forces out of Egypt. Then, Rommel was squezed between the forces of Montgomery 
and Allied troops under General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Axis forces surrendered on 13 
May 1943 and Egyp remained secure for the rest of the war. See, Hahn, The United 
States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956 , 11, 12, 30.
3. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956 , 30.
4. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956 , 30.
5. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956 , 34.
6. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956 , 34, 35.
7. FRUS, Vol. 1, Eastern Europe, The Change in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the 
Secretary of State, Telegram / Moscow, 27 February 1946 , 702.
8. FRUS, Vol. 1, Eastern Europe, The Change in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the 
Secretary of State, Telegram / Moscow, 27 February 1946 , 705.
9. Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 51.
10. Joseph Smith, The Cold War 1945-1965 (London: Basic Blackwell Ltd., 1986), 
12.
11. George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World: Adventures in Diplomacy (New 
York: Harper&Row Publishers, 1993), 20.
12. Smith, The Cold War 1945-1956 , 12.
13. Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: Praeger, 1983), 124.
14. McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World , 84.
15. McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World , 85.
16. McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World , 86, 87.
17. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956,23.
Notes to Ch. II
84
18. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956,23.
19. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956,97.
20. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956 , 100.
21. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956 , 101.
22. Anthony Nutting, No End of A Lesson (London: Constable&Co.Ltd., 1967), 33,34.
23. McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World ,211.
24. The Tripartite Declaration continued to be cited as a basis for various actions in the 
Middle East by every American President up to Carter. See also, McGhee, Envoy to 
the Middle World , 212.
25. McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World , 273.
26. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956,28.
27. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956,28, 29.
28. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956,30.
29. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956,30.
30. This was later remarked by US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, as: “‘if there was 
a political stillbirth, this was it”. See, Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster 
Dulles (Canada:Little,Brown&Co., 1973) , 180, 181.
31. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956,30.
32. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy , 31, 32.
33. This incident came to be known as “Black Saturday”. See, Hoopes, The Devil and 
John Foster Dulles , 181.
34. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956,32.
35. P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1978), 
108.
36. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation , 108.
37. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956,58.
38. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation , 108.
Notes to Ch. II
85
39. Robert Stephens, Nasser (Aylesbury, Bucks: Pelican Books, 1973), 109.
40. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956 , 24
41. David Devereux, The Formulation of British Defense Policy Towards the Middle 
East 1948-56 (Canada: Macmillan Ltd., 1990,), 156.
42. Devereux, The Formulation of British Defense Policy Towards the Middle East 
1948-56 , 156, 157.
43. Isaac Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel U.S.-Israeli Relations 1953-1960 (Gainesville: 
The University Press of Florida, 1993), 21.
44. Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel , 21.
45. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945-1956 , 158.
46. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956 , 80, 81.
47. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956 , 83.
48. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956 , 83.
49. From, Royal Institute of International Affairs, “Manifesto of the Egyptian 
Liberation Rally,” published on 16 January 1953 in. Documents on International 
Affairs 1953 (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 308.
50. Yair Evron, The Middle East: Nations, Super-powers and Wars (London: Elek 
Books Ltd., 1973), 132.
51. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956 , 83.
52. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956 , 83.
53. Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles , 182.
54. William R. Polk, The Arab World Today (Massachusets: Harvard University 
Press, 1991), 390.
55. P. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1961), 90-92 passim.
56. Leonard Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor. Allen, and John Foster Dulles 
and Their Family Network (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1978), 384.
57. Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and Thier 
Family Network , 384.
Notes to Ch. II
86
58. Anthony Nutting, Nasser (London; Constable and Co. Ltd., 1972), 78.
59. Nutting, Nasser , 79.
60. Nutting, Nasser , 77.
61. Nutting, Nasser , 77.
62. Nutting, Nasser , 80.
63. Her Britannic Majesty’s Government Cabinet Papers, “Middle East Defence, 
Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff,” on 9th January 1954 in. Cabinet Papers, CAB. 
129/65, C.(54) 9 .
64. Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and Their 
Family Network , 383, 384.
65. Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and Their 
Family Network , 384.
66. Her Britannic Majesty’s Government Cabinet Papers, “United States Project to 
Associate Military Aid To Pakistan With Middle East Defence, Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,” on 5th January 1954 in. Cabinet Papers, CAB. 
129/65, C.(54) 4 .
67. CAB. 129/65, C.(54) 4 , Article 3.
68. Evron, The Middle E ast, 133.
69. SEATO was another anti-communist military pact made up of the US, Britain, 
France, Australia, New Zealand, The Philipinnes, Thailand and Pakistan, and was 
formed in September 1954, to counter the communist threat in the south-west Pacific 
area below the latitude, 21-31, See, Polk, The Arab World Today , 392.
70. Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 49.
71. As the US had experienced this in Mexico, its companies had much suffered from 
the nationalisation of their properties.
72. McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World , 79.
73. Scott Lucas, Divided We Stand: The US and the Suez Crisis (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1991), 25.
74. Elisabeth Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East 1914-1971 (London: 
Chatto&Windus Ltd., 1981), 180.
Notes to Ch. II
87
75. Keith Kyle, Suez (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd., 1991), 56.
76. Kyle, Suez , 54.
77. The US in conjunction with Britain, aimed to seek a solution to the Arab-Israeli 
dispute through covert negotiations as well. See, Ashton, Hijacking of A Pact ,131.
78. Ashton, Hijacking of A Pact, 131.
79. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics , 94.
Notes to Ch. Ill
1. Another perspective on the Baghdad Pact, linking the American promotion of 
such an organisation with Britain’s decision to join it in April 1955, considered 
the pact as “0« illustration of collaborative policy at its best,” Ashton, Hijacking of A 
Pact , 123.
2. Nutting, Nasser ,81.
3. On the Sanjak of Hatay (where the main city and bay is İskenderun) which had 
acquired a special regime of local autonomy under the French Mandate for Syria, 
various agreements between Turkey and France had previously been made, the most 
recent being in July 1938, with the Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship.
4. The Press in Iraq was strictly controlled by the government, and the situation was not 
different from this, in throughout the almost entire Middle East. Chatham House 
Review, The World Today 1955 (London: Chatham House, 1955), 147.
5. Chatham House Review , The World Today 1955 , 147, 148.
6. Lucas, Divided We Stand , 41, 42.
7. Nutting, Nasser ,81. On 20 February 1955, Eden stopped off in Cairo on his way 
to a conference in Bangkok of the SEATO, and met Nasser. Following the exchanges of 
congratulations over the new Anglo-Egyptian treaty, Eden shifted to discuss Egyptian- 
Iraqi relations and the Turkish-Iraqi Pact. Eden’s impressions of Nasser (which he 
reported to Churchill on his arrival in London) can also explain some of the reasons 
behind Nasser’s disturbance of the Turkish-Iraqi Pact: “/  was impressed by Nasser, who 
seemed forthright and friendly although not open to conviction on the Turkish-Iraqi 
Pact. No doubt jealousy plays a part in this, and a frustrated desire to lead the Arab 
world". Lucas, Divided We Stand , 41. See also. Nutting, Nasser , 89.
8. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation, 230.
Notes to Ch. I ll
88
Notes to Ch. I ll
9. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation, 230.
10. Noble Frankland, ed., “Statement by Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Iraqi Representative to the 
United Nations, to the Charter of Deputies, on 6 February 1955,” in Documents on 
International Affairs 1955 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford 
University Press, 1958), 320, 321.
11. Nutting, Nasser , 89.
12. William R. Polk, The US and the Arab World (Massachusets: Harvard University 
Press, 1991), 202.
13. Chatham House Review, The World Today , 148.
14. Nutting, Nasser , 82.
15. Nutting, Nasser , 82.
16. Nutting, Nasser , 83.
17. Nutting, Nasser , 85.
18. Eventually, at the request of the Premiers of the Arab League, Nasser consented to 
receive an Iraqi delegation deputizing for Nuri As-Said, which took its seat on 27 
January, whereas, there was still a good deal of doubt and hesitation prevailing at the 
conference. Chatham House Review, The World Today 1955 , 148, 149.
19. Polk, The Arab World Today , 392.
20. See, Appendix B.
21. Polk, The US and the Arab World , 230.
22. Robert W. Macdonald, The League of Arab States (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1965), 77, 78.
23. Fahir Armaoğlu, XX. Yüz Yıl Siyasi Tarihi 1914-1980 Vol. I (Ankara: T.C. İş 
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1991), 492.
24. The Israeli doctrine of inflicting military reprisal for a string chain of border 
incidents first applied against Jordan in October 1953. See, Kylie, Suez , 62.
25. Chatham House Review, The World Today 1955 , 150.
26. Chatham House Review, The World Today 1955 , 150, 151.
27. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956 , 107.
89
28. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956 , 108.
29. Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez (Vermont: Amana Books, 1988), 152.
30. Frankland, ed., “Comment by the Israeli Foreign Ministry on the Signature of the 
Turkish-Iraqi Pact,” in Documents on International Affairs 1955 , 289.
31. Evron, The Middle E ast, 133.
32. In his Waging Peace , Eisenhower evaluated this incident as: “The first evidence of 
serious communist penetration in the Middle East in the fall o f 1955. . . .  in what has 
since become called the notorious Nasser’s arms deal”. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The 
White House Years: Mandate For Change 1953-1956 (New York: Garden City, 
Doubleday&Co., 1965), 24.
33. Richard Goold-Adams, The Time of Power (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1962), 79. The arms deal was a “source of deep anxiety,” Foreign Secretary 
Harold Macmillan wrote, because it signaled the "opening of a new offensive in 
the Middle East”. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956 , 
192.
34. Alistair Horne, Harold Macmillan Vol I. of the Official Bibliography (London: 
Macmillan London Ltd., 1988), 378.
35. The Tripartite Agreement signed between US, Britain and France in 1950, was 
designed among other things, to prevent an arms race among the major powers of the 
Middle East, in particular, Egypt, Iraq and Israel. See also, Geoffrey Kemp, “The 
Military Build-up: Arms Control or Arms Trade ? ,” in Crisis Management and the 
Super-powers in the Middle East , ed. by Gregory Trevarton (London: The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Gower Publishing Ltd., 1981), 31.
36. The arms transfers from the Soviets were introduced in a way in which Nasser’s 
image was supported. Nasser, hitherto, an unfavoured ruler by the large groups which 
disliked him due to his overthrow of General Naguib and the oppression of him on the 
Muslim Brotherhood, “Turned into an all-Arab hero and master o f the Arab street, 
overnight”. See, Nadav Safran, From War to War (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril 
Educational Publishing, 1977), 51.
37. Lucas, Divided We Stand , 48.
38. As Robert Rhodes James elaborated: “these events amounted to a humiliation for 
the United States, joyfully reported on Radio Cairo and in Al Ahram”. See, James, 
Anthony Eden , 444.
Notes to Ch. I ll
39. Erskine B. Childers, The Road to Suez 
Publishing, 1977), 133, 134.
(London: Bobbs-Merril Educational
90
40. Childers, The Road to Suez , 133, 134.
41. Lucas, Divided We Stand , 59.
42. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation , 232.
43. In reality, communism in Egypt was not unified. The largest group was the 
Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL). DMNL was in support of 
Free Officers, and during the first half of 1955, Nasser had put nearly 750 communist 
members behind the bars. See, Joel Beinan, “The Communist Movement and 
Nationalist Political Discourse in Nasserist Egypt,” in The Middle East Studies 
(Autumn, 1987), 568-584, passim.
44. Horne, Harold Macmillan Vol. I of the Official Bibliography , 378.
Notes to Ch.III
45. Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East 
Routledge&Kegan Paul Ltd., 1959), 211.
(London:
46. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956 ,111.
47. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956 ,111.
48. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956 , 112.
49. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956 , 112.
50. Peter Lyon, Eisenhower Portrait of the Hero (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 685.
51. The project of strengthening the pro-Western countries along the borders of the 
Soviet Union had begun in 1950, under the Truman administration but, stalled by the 
reconstruction of Europe and the outbreak of the war in Korea. Following the shift in 
US’ military and economic aid programs from Europe towards countries in the Middle 
East and east Asia, the US concentrated its efforts on regaining the initiative against the 
Soviet Union. See, Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah , 93.
52. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy 1941-1973: A Study of Foreign 
Policy in Modernizing Nations (Virginia: The University Press of Virginia, 1975), 
276.
53. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1953-1956 , 165.
54. Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy 1941-1973 , 277.
55. Frankland, “US State Department’s Statement on Persian Adherence to the 
Baghdad Pact, 12 October 1955,” in Documents on International Affairs 1955 , 304.
91
56. Ramazanı, Iran’s Foreign Policy 1941-1973 , 278.
57. Ramazanı, Iran’s Foreign Policy 1941-1973,279.
58. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East ,178.
59. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, 178.
60. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle E ast, 193.
61. Frankland, “Soviet note to Persia, 12 October 1955,” in Documents on 
International Affairs 1955 , 305.
62. Frankland, Documents on International Affairs 1955 , 208.
Notes to ch. IV
Notes to Ch. IV
1. Safran, From War to War , 69.
2. Lucas, Divided We Stand , 68.
3. Certainly, the most apparent signal that Nasser was getting entangled with 
anti-Western designs was his recognition of communist China and breaking off relations 
with Formosa on 16 May 1955. To Western diplomats, he tried to explain that he 
had fears that the Soviets might agree to Western proposals for an arms embargo to 
the Middle East. He said, in case of an embargo, he might be able to find 
another source in China. In reality, Egypt had already sold £10 million worth of cotton 
to China and a Chinese mission was established in a large villa in Cairo. See, Stephens, 
Nasser , 183, 184.
4. Lucas, Divided We Stand , 79.
5. Anthony Sampson, Macmillan A Study of Ambiguity (London: Allen Lane The 
Penguin Press, 1967), 104.
6. Lucas, Divided We Stand ,91.
7. James, Anthony Eden , 429.
8. Lucas, Divided We Stand , 75.
9. Frankland, “Speech by Anthony Eden in the House of Commons, on 12 November 
1955,” in Documents on International Affairs 1955 , 394, 395.
92
10. FRUS 1955-1957 Vol. XIII , Subject: Jordanian Adherence to the Baghdad Pact, 8.
11. Kylie, Suez , 90.
12. Kylie, Suez , 90.
13. Sherman Adams, First-hand Report The Inside Story of the Eisenhower 
Administration (London: Hutchinson&Co. Ltd., 1962), 196.
14. Lyon, Eisenhower Portrait of the Hero , 686.
15. Lyon, Eisenhower Portrait of the Hero , 686, 687.
16. Lucas, Divided We Stand , 129.
17. Neff, Warriors at Suez , 174.
18. Neff, Warriors at Suez , 174, 175.
19. James, Anthony Eden , 433.
20. Neff, Warriors at Suez , 124, 125.
21. Macdonald, The League of Arab States , 293.
22. Lucas, Divided We Stand , 129.
23. Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism Jordan 1955-1967 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1989), 36.
24. Kyle, Suez , 90.
25. Additionally, Moscow was not a reliable ally to substitute the Western aid. 
Corresponding to this, Dimitri Shepilov expressed that, the Soviet Union was not 
interested in financing Egypt in its Aswan Dam project, as Egypt was considered to be 
in need of a more general economic development. See, Lucas, Divided We Stand, 138.
26. Noble Frankland, Vera King eds., from the “Introduction to the Suez Crisis,” in 
Documents on International Affairs 1956 (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1959), 73.
27. Frankland, King, from the “Speech by President Nasser at Alexandria, 27 July 
1956,” in Documents on International Affairs 1956 , 80,81.
28. Frankland, King, Documents on International Affairs 1956 , 80, 81.
Notes to Ch. IV
93
29. Frankland, King, from the “Answer by Sir Anthony Eden to Questions in the 
House of Commons on the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, 27 July 1956,” 
in Documents on International Affairs 1956 , 115.
30. Frankland, King, from the “Introduction to the Suez Crisis,” in Documents on 
International Affairs 1956 , 73, 74.
31. As a result of the disintegration of the Ottoman, Hapsburg, Hohenzollern and 
Romanov Empires and the changes in the British which had been occurred since 1888, 
the operative word was in essence “beneficiaries” . The signatories to the 1888 
Convention were the representatives of Britain, France, Turkey, Germany, Austria, 
Hungary, Spain, Italy, Netherlands and Russia.
32. Lucas, Divided We Stand , 155.
33. Adams, First-hand Report, 105.
34. Neff, Warriors at Suez , 290.
35. Neff, Warriors at Suez , 289.
36. Lucas, Divided We Stand , 186.
37. Nutting, No End of A Lesson , 110.
38. From the outset, Eisenhower evaluated the Suez Canal dispute and the influence of 
Nasser in the Arab world as two separate issues neither of which could be solved by 
war. Truly, Eden’s panic about the action of Nasser was not shared by the US. For the 
US, the Canal was less important economically than Britain and Europe. In the eyes of 
the US policy makers, the Canal was an inconvenient issue to try to bring down Nasser 
because of its colonialist associations. Besides, ''Egypt could count on widespread Arab 
and Afro-Asian sympathy as she faced the two old imperial Powers, Britain and 
France”. Thus, dealing with Nasser was seen in Washington as a long-term process. 
Stephens, Nasser , 204, 205.
39. Lucas, Divided We Stand , 239.
40. Frankland, King, Documents on International Affairs 1956 , 244.
41. Stephens, Nasser , 246, 247. Evidently, Nasser’s gamble had a dark side. Whilst 
it fostered the self-confidence of the Arab countries, it increased the risk takings in the 
foreign policy decisions makings. Almost a decade later, Nasser hoped in June 1967-Six 
Day-War, to emerge as political and diplomatic victor without having to wage war, as 
he had succeeded in doing after Suez in 1956. However, Nasserism became the 
principal victim of the Six Day War which seriously challenged the room for huge risk­
taking in foreign policy formulation emergent from the Suez experience. See also.
Notes to Ch. IV
94
Bassam Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East 1967-91 (New York; St. Martin’s 
Press, 1993), 82, 92, 93.
Notes to Ch. V
Notes to ch. V
1. David R. Devereux, The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle 
East 1948-56 (Canada: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1990), 184.
2. Fullick, Suez; The Double War , 5.
3. Horne, Macmillan , 21.
4. Horne, Macmillan , 16.
5. Ashton, Hijacking of A Pact, 131.
6. Ashton, Hijacking of A Pact, 136.
7. Devereux, The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle East 
1948-56 , 184.
8. Ashton, Hijacking of A Pact, 136.
9. Horne, Macmillan , 93.
10. Ashton, Hijacking of A Pact, 136.
11. Horne, Macmillan , 99.
95
A P P E N D I X  A
PACT OF MUTUAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND TURKEY, 
BAGHDAD, 24 FEBRUARY 1955
Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey 
are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty of 
Friendship and Good Neighbourhood concluded between His Majesty the King of Iraq 
and his Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on March 
29, 1946, which recognised the fact that peace and security between the two countries is 
an integral part of the peace and security of all the nations of the Middle East, and that 
it is the basis for their foreign policies;
Whereas article II of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation 
between the Arab League States provides that no provision of that treaty shall in 
any way affect, any of the rights and obligations accruing to the Contracting 
Parties from the United Nations Charter;
And having realised the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as 
members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in 
the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures in accordance 
with article 51 of the United Nations Charter;
They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a pact fulfilling 
these aims, and for that purpose have appointed as their pleni-potentiaries:-
His Majesty King Faisal II,
King of Iraq;
His Excellency A1 Farik Nuri As-Said,
Prime Minister;
His Excellency Burhanuddin Bash-Ayan,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,
His Excellency Jalal Bayar,
President of the Turkish Republic;
His Excellency Adnan Menderes,
Prime Minister;
His Excellency Fuat Köprülü,
Minister for Foreign Affairs;
who having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have 
agreed as follows:-
ARTICLE 1
Consistent with article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting 
Parties will co-operate for their security and defence. Such measures as they agree to 
take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with 
each other.
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In order to ensure the realisation and affect application of the co-operation 
provided for in article 1 above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting 
Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present pact enters into 
force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the 
Governments of the High Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 2
ARTICLE 3
The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference 
whatsoever in each other’s internal affairs. They will settle any dispute between 
themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.
ARTICLE 4
The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present pact are 
not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of 
them with any third State or States. They do not derogate from and cannot be 
interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The High Contracting 
Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the 
present pact.
ARTICLE 5
This pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any 
other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is 
fully recognised by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession shall come into 
force from the date of which the instrument of the accession of the State concerned is 
deposited with the Mimistry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.
Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements, 
in accordance with article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact. The 
competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures will become 
operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the parties 
concerned.
ARTICLE 6
A Permanent Council at ministerial level will be set up to function within the 
framework of the purposes of this pact when at least four Powers become parties to the 
pact.
The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure.
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This pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five- 
year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the pact by notifying the other 
parties in writing of its desire to do so six months before the expiration of any of the 
above-mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains valid for the other parties.
ARTICLE 7
ARTICLE 8
This pact shall be ratified by the contracting parties and ratifications shall be 
exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the 
date of the exchange of ratifications.
In witness whereof, the said plenipotentiaries have signed the present pact in 
Arabic, Turkish and English, all three texts being equally authentic except in case of 
doubt when the English text shall prevail.
Done in duplicate at Baghdad this second day of Rajab 1374 Hijri corresponding 
to the twenty-fourth day of February, 1955.
NURI AS-SAID.
For His Majesty the King of Iraq.
BURHANUDDIN BASH-AY AN.
For His Majesty the King of Iraq.
ADNAN MENDERES.
For The President of the Turkish Republic.
FUAT KÖPRÜLÜ.
For The President of the Turkish Republic.
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A P P E N D I X  B
Special Agreement
Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of Iraq 
(with Exchanges of Notes)*
Baghdad, April 4, 1955
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the Kingdom of Iraq,
Considering that the United Kingdom intends to accede to the Pact of Mutual 
Co-operation between Iraq and Turkey signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955; and
Desiring as equal and sovereign partners in the Pact to make a Special 
Agreement in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of the Pact;
Have agreed as follows:-
ARTICLE 1
The two Contracting Governments shall maintain and develop peace and 
friendship between their two countries and shall co-operate for their security and 
defence in accordance with the Pact of Mutual Co-operation.
ARTICLE 2
The Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and Iraq, signed at 
Baghdad on June 30, 1930, with annexture and Notes Exchanged, shall terminate from 
the date when the present Agreement comes into force.
ARTICLE 3
The Government of Iraq by the present Agreement undertake no obligations 
beyond the frontiers of Iraq.
ARTICLE 4
The Government of Iraq assume full responsibility for the defence of Iraq and 
will command and guard all defence installations in Iraq.
* Exchanged Notes are not included here.
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In accordance with Article 1 of the Pact, there shall be close co-operation 
between the competent authorities of the two Governments for the defence of Iraq. This 
co-operation shall include planning, combined training and the provision of such 
facilities as may be agreed upon between the two Contracting Governments for this 
purpose and with the object of maintaining Iraq’s armed forces at all times in a state of 
efficiency and readiness.
ARTICLE 5
ARTICLE 6
The Government of the United Kingdom shall, at the request of the Government 
of Iraq, do their best.
(a) to afford help to Iraq;
(i) in creating and maintaining an effective Iraqi Air Force by means of 
joint training and exercises in the Middle East;
(ii) in the efficient maintenance and operation of such airfields and other 
installations as may from time to time be agreed to be necessary;
(b) to join with the Government of Iraq in-
(i) establishing an efficient system of warning against air attacks;
(ii) ensuring that equipment for the defence of Iraq is kept in Iraq in a 
state of readiness;
(iii) training and equipping Iraqi Forces for the defence of their country;
(c) to make available in Iraq technical personnel of the British forces for the 
purpose of giving effect to the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
Article.
ARTICLE 7
Service aircraft of the two countries shall enjoy staging and over-flying facilities 
in each other’s territories.
ARTICLE 8
In the event of an armed attack against Iraq or threat of an armed attack which, 
in the opinion of the two Contracting Governments, endangers the security of Iraq, the 
Government of the United Kingdom at the request of the Government of Iraq shall 
provide all facilities and assistance to enable such aid to be rapid and effective.
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ARTICLE 9
(a) The present Agreement shal come into force on the date on which the United 
Kingdom becomes a party to the Pact. **
(b) The Agreement shall remain in force so long as both Iraq and the United 
Kingdom are Parties to the Pact.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed 
the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done at Baghdad this 11th day of Shaban, 1374 Hijri, corresponding to the 4th 
day of April, 1955, in duplicate, in English and Arabic Languages, both texts being 
equally authentic except in cases of doubt when the English text shall prevail.
(L.S.) ROBERT H. TURTON (L.S.) NOURRY SAID 
(L.S.) MICHAEL WRIGHT (L.S.) B. BASHAYAN
** The United Kingdom acceded to Turco-Iraqi Pact on April 5, 1955.
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